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Abstract 
This research focuses on a twofold  issue: 1) the challenges that 
globalization creates to institutions, having to deal with a new 
international order; 2) the challenges that state governan ce creates for 
global actors, having to adapt themselves to the national and  sub -
national peculiarities. The globalization –bureaucracy interplay is a 
politically contested  phenomenon, in which d ifferent models of 
interactions among states, firms, and  citizens appear and  transform 
both nationally and  internationally. 
At the national level, the impact of globalization on quality of 
governance is examined  empirically across countries. The analysis with 
fixed  effects models is based  on a panel d ataset, covering  over 
100 countries in the period  1992–2010. The stud y examines an effect 
from both economic and  social globalization factors on d ifferent 
governance features, includ ing governance effectiveness, regulatory 
quality, control of corruption, accountability, p olitical stability, and  rule 
of law. The find ings show that various governance features seem to 
d iverge in how easily they respond  to the new state of affairs that 
follows with more globalization. Moreover, in line with the theoretical 
pred ictions, globalization affects institutions d ifferently depending on 
the country‘s level of development. The results thus suggest that the 
previous find ings on positive effects of international economic flows on 
institutional quality are likely d riven by changes in rich countries. 
The impact of institutional policies on globalization factors is analyzed  
at the sub-national level, using a panel dataset of 82 Russian regions in 
the period  1995–2010. The study takes an advantage of examining 
d ifferent types of fiscal incentives, introduced  in some regions of Russia 
in 2003, treating them as a natural experiment and  estimating the 
causal effect of tax concessions on foreign d irect investment inflows 
with two causal inference techniques: d ifference in d ifferences 
estimation and  synthetic controls method . The find ings confirm that tax 
concessions for investment lead  to more foreign d irect investment 
inflows. However, selective tax concessions for the government 
sanctioned  important investment projects do not have the expected  
effect, or the effect is sporad ic and  weak at best. As governments seek 
to increase the national and  sub-national attractiveness for foreign 
investors, these find ings have important implications for the design of 
institutional policies. 
 
1 
1. Introduction 
Globalization transforms modern society and  economy. The states, 
therefore, face a challenge in adap ting themselves to the global factors 
and  networks. They ought to implement new policies or to change 
existing ones, seeking integration into the international o rder. 
However, one generally sees the governmental structures as highly 
inertial and  slow to change. Once their formal method s and  procedures 
are established , they tend  to use the same methods and  rules, whether 
the situation changes or not. And  even if bu reaucratic structures do 
change under an external pressure, it is unclear how far the 
development would  go. Thus, one might wonder about the effect that 
the rigid  and  sluggish state bureaucracies have on globalization factors. 
In some cases, extensive administrative burdens and  formalities 
restrain the development of international trade, investment, and  
migration. On the other hand , in those countries where many of the 
administrative proced ures and  bureaucratic institutions are weak or 
unspecified , global actors would  find  neither field  to act, nor rules to 
follow. The question is on a mutual effect of bureaucracy and  
globalization in this interp lay. Does globalization reduce bureaucratic 
barriers through, for example, multilateral agreements or internationa l 
norms? Or d oes it create just the opposite, a new kind  of 
―internationally widespread‖ bureaucracy? Does bureaucracy support 
international cooperation by provid ing the legal and  institu tional 
framework? Or on the contrary, does it fight with the global features, 
trying to keep its purely national power?  
This research focuses on a twofold  issue: 1) the challenges that 
globalization creates to the existing national and  sub-national 
institutions, having to deal with an expanding international order; 2) 
the challenges that state governance creates for global actors, having to 
adap t themselves to the domestic formal and  informal peculiarities. 
Globalization–bureaucracy interplay is a politically contested  
phenomenon, in which d ifferent models of interactions among states, 
firms, and  citizens appear and  transform both nationally and  
internationally. 
Each state keeps its national interests above all. But globalization 
comes, to a large extent, as the weakening or even removal of the 
institutional buffers between domestic economy and  global markets. (Ó 
Riain, 2000) States, therefore, should  respond  to pressures from local 
societies and  global markets simultaneously that leads to the changes 
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not only in the state-markets interaction but also in the state structures 
themselves. 
States are interconnected , and  none cou ld  be totally isolated  from the 
global order. States are integrated  into global markets through, for 
instance, international trad e and  production d istribution (Wallerstein, 
2011). Besides, states compete w ith one another to attract mobile capital 
(Arrighi, 1994). Moreover, business expansion requires more 
bureaucratic work on creating and  ad apting regulations, which leads to 
the expansion of the state apparatus (Chase-Dunn and  Grimes, 1995). 
Different models of state's reaction to globalization might spread  
through the interaction of states or through the influence of 
international and  supranational organizations. Globalization may pose 
new problems for states, but it also may reinforce states to identify an d  
to manage those problems on behalf of their societies (Meyer et al., 
1997). Contemporary theories both in political science and  in economics 
emphasize the ways in which national and  global actors interact with 
each other (Block, 1994; Evans, 1997). The relations among them are 
essentially tense, and  competition fights can often result in a zero -sum 
game. The d irection and  pace of the country's development are 
determined  by how institu tions regulate these tensions, creating basis 
for both national actors, going global, and  foreign actors, coming into 
the country. This development is path -dependent and  reflects the 
mutual effect of state and  private actors at the subnational, national, 
and  international levels. In this respect, Bandelj (2009) argues that the  
global economy can be conceptualized  as an instituted  process
1
. States 
contribute to the institu tionalization of globalization by ad apting 
formal policies, as well as informal norms, by provid ing both domestic 
and  foreign actors with organizational resources, and  by supporting 
real economic and  social interactions (Bandelj, 2009). 
The globalization–institutions interactions have received  some 
attention among the political theorists, but so far have not been 
examined  empirically. Does good  governance actually promote 
international cooperation? Does globalization itself support better 
governance? Do the available measures of globalization and  
institutional quality provid e a reliable tool to answer these questions? 
The answers to these questions have both theoretical and  policy 
implications. If globalization or its various sub-components are able to 
                                                          
1
 She uses Polanyi's (1957 [1944]) idea about "economy as instituted  process," meaning 
interactions between economic and  noneconomic institutions. 
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improve quality of governance, then international factors should  be 
taken into account not only in cross-country comparisons but also in 
implementation and  analysis of domestic policies. 
Before examining the strength and  d irection of the relationship  
between d omestic bureaucracies and  globalization factors, one should  
define how to conceptualize both bureaucracy and  globalization and  
how to assess them. Hence, the thesis proceed s as follows. Chapter 2 
d iscusses institutional features of bureaucracy and  their reflection in 
the existing measures of governance quality. Then it proceeds to 
describing globalization as a process and  as a historical phenomenon, 
and  to exp laining how bureaucracy and  globalization shape and  
reshape each other. Chapter 3 d iscusses the impact of various types of 
globalization on institutional quality at the national level and  then 
examines this impact empirically with the analysis of a panel data set, 
covering over 100 countries in the period  1992–2010. Chapter 4 
d iscusses the effect from the fiscal elements of institutional policies on 
globalization factors at the sub-national level. The effect is tested 
empirically, using a panel dataset of 82 regions of Russia in the period  
1995–2010. 
 
  
4 
2. Institutions in the Era of Globalization: Literature Review  
2.1 Governance and the features of bureaucracy 
One of the most important roles of the state in market economy is in 
determining the rules of domestic–international interaction by creating, 
implementing, and  adapting various types of regulations. This role, as 
well as many others, heavily depends on the quality of government, i.e. 
the functioning of executive branches and  their bureaucracies. 
Importance of bureaucratic work is defined  by the ability of public 
officials a) to deliver services both to market actors and  to society, and  
b) to create and  enforce ru les and  regulations (Olsen, 1988; Fukuyama, 
2013).  
Many sound  theoretical models, created  in th e XX century, contributed  
to the analysis and  understand ing of bureaucratic structures (Weber, 
1978 [1946]; Blau, 1955; Tullock, 1965; Crozier, 2009[1964]; Lipsky, 1980; 
Mises, 1983 [1944]; Downs, 1994 [1966]; Niskanen, 1994 [1971]).  
Weber's classical analysis provides systematic arguments on the 
genesis and  features of bureaucracy. Weber described  in details the 
fundamental role of bureaucracy for a country's development. 
Particularly, he listed  several features of bureaucratic structures, 
includ ing the following (Weber, 1978: 196-203): 
- There are some fixed  jurisd ictional areas, ordered  by laws and  
administrative regulations, 
- There is a hierarchy within a fixed  system of super - and  
subord ination, 
- The officials undergo thorough and  expert training , 
- There are some general ru les, stable and  exhaustive, 
- The officials are appointed  by a superior au thority , 
- There is a career path within the office, 
- *The officials get a fixed  salary. 
- *The office constitutes tenure for life, and  
- *Job requires full working capacity of the official 
Last three of the listed  features do not reflect modern reality, though. 
As Fukuyama (2013) points out, fixed  salaries are not compatible with 
the market-like incentives often offered  to bureaucrats under New 
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Public Management. Moreover, it is common for talented  ind ivid uals 
from the private sector or the academy in many countries to serve in 
government for periods of time.  
Many stud ies dealt with the other Weberian features later on, having 
come, however, to rather d ifferent conclusions. 
Austrian School of economics sees bureaucracy mainly as an 
instrument, the tool for executing laws and  regulations. State function 
could  not be realized  without bureaucratic work: ―There is a field , 
namely, the handling of the apparatus of government, in which 
bureaucratic methods are required  by necessity‖ (Mises, 1983: 48). 
Minimal bureaucracy is required  for the protection of property rights, 
physical property, and  the people, as well as for insuring social 
cooperation among the members of society and  market actors (Mises, 
1983: 20). 
However, there is always a danger of overwhelming bureaucracy, 
unable to correct its own errors, that would  requ ire some external 
(market or social) factors to intervene. ―The bureaucrats see in the 
failure of their preced ing measures a proof that further inroads into the 
market system are necessary‖ (Mises, 1983: 35).  
Public choice theorists concentrate on problems of bureaucratic 
accountability. This school of research analyzes the pathologies of 
overwhelming institutions, their implications, and  the possible 
methods of control from society. Tullock (1965) investigated  harmful 
effects of misinformation that cou ld  be channeled  within the hierarchy 
of ad ministrative structures. Crozier (2009) later concludes that the lack 
of accountability, be it before elected  officials, citizens, or pressure 
groups, is attributable to bureaucratic inertia (see Meier and  Krause 
(2003) for d iscussion). Niskanen (1994) extended  this view, claiming 
that bureaucracy is preoccupied  with its own budget maximization and  
its interests contrad ict the interests of society, thus, making bureaucrats 
unresponsive to society demands. Downs (1994) argued  that the 
ind ividual preferences of bureaucrats might d iffer, thus policy making 
and  coord inating process could  become d ifficult. Finally, Olson (2000) 
claimed  that the main aim of political development should  be the 
creation of instruments like rule of law and  accountability that could  
limit the state‘s d iscretion. 
The scholars w ithin a principal–agent framework look for the methods 
of corruption control and  better accountability through manipulation of 
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incentives, e.g. competition, manipu lation of wage scales, shortening of 
accountability rou tes, etc. (see Fukuyama (2013) for d iscussion). Many  
stud ies, app lying the principal–agent views, found  various incentives 
and  monitoring activities being effective in controlling the behaviour of 
bureaucrats (Miller and  Moe, 1983; Moe, 1990; Scholz and  Wei, 1986; 
Scholz, Twombly, and  Headrick, 1991; Weingast and  Moran, 1983).  
Other stud ies of bureaucracy and  bureaucratic performance examined  
the importance of the bureaucrats‘ values and  its impact on public 
policy outputs (Eisner, 1991; Khademian, 1992). Several researches 
showed how attempts to impose var ious bud geting systems have been 
altered  and  even sabotaged  by bureaucrats in the implementation 
process (Wildavsky, 1984 [1964]; Meier and  Krause, 2003). Finally, open 
systems theories of bureaucracy focus on how organizations cope with 
the political environment (Keiser, 1999), as well as on a general 
framework for assessing political control (Meier, 2000; Meier and  
Krause, 2003). 
2.2 Measuring quality of bureaucracy 
To assess empirically the mutual impact of bureaucracy and  
globalization, one should  be able to measure the quality of governance 
with a reliable, cross-nationally comparable tool. Existing measures 
typically rely, in whole or in part, on surveys of either expert op inions, 
either market actors (international and  d omestic firms), or citizens. 
Questions in such surveys involve national laws and  regulations , the 
level of ―red  tape‖ and  administrative burdens, or perceptions of 
corruption (Chong and  Calderón, 2000; Mauro, 1995).  
These measures, however, have a number of limitations. First, as the 
understand ing of governance features d iffers among the fields and  
theories, d ifferent experts may intend  d ifferent things when 
responding to the same survey question (Fukuyama, 2013). Another 
issue is the assumption that the interests of firms (either foreign or 
domestic) and  the interests of the nation are similar (Kurtz and  
Schrank, 2007). For instance, some regulations, imposed  by the state 
(e.g. labor laws, environmental controls, or antitrust actions) may be 
assessed  as ―burdensome‖ and  ―growth -inhibiting‖ by the market 
actors. If, however, such controls do not exist, states might be judged  
less severely by the firms (Kurtz and  Schrank, 2007). Moreover, as 
Rothstein (2011) points out, the existing ind icators of governance 
quality presume some strong norm ative policy preferences (e.g., less 
rather than more regu lation), which might skew their values. Finally, 
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since the d irect assessment of many governance aspects is not possible, 
most of the ind icators approximate them (with, for example, input–
output evaluations), i.e. ―measure what is measurable‖ (Fukuyama, 
2013). 
Taking into account the listed  limitations, it is worth d iscussing the 
ind icators from three well-known sources: the World wide Governance 
Ind icators produced  by the World  Bank (WGI), the Global 
Competitiveness Report by the World  Economic Forum (GCS), and  the 
Risk Briefing assessment as well as the Democracy Index by the 
Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) (table 1).  
These measures have a number of advantages. First, they include 
d ifferent types of measures: aggregate ind icators (WGI), survey (GCS), 
and  experts‘ assessment (EIU)
2
. Secondly, unlike some other ind icators, 
these sources cover a considerable number of countries. The WGI ha s 
started  with 185 countries in 1996 and  offered  the scores for alread y 210 
countries in 2010. The EIU observes 170 countries in the Democracy 
Index (issued  early from 2006) and  179 countries in the Risk Briefing 
assessments (this number has increased  from 120 countries in 1996). 
The biggest development occurred  in the GCS: from 58 countries in 
1996 up to 133 countries in 2010. Third ly, they concentrate, again unlike 
some others, not only on one aspect of governance, e.g. corruption, but 
on many d ifferent features of the government functioning, includ ing 
political representation, stability and  balance of powers, red  tape, 
corruption, liberal policies and  their implementation, etc.  
This broad  range of features, however, creates also some conceptual 
and  method ological problems. First of them is related  to the enduring 
debate on what is governance. Due to the lack of agreement in 
definitions even among the political theorists, the sources of numerous 
―institutional‖ indexes and  ind icators try to avoid  giving their own 
definitions. Instead , they offer a variety of questions and / or marks to 
describe certain aspects of the government‘s work. And  although it 
looks sometimes like touching d ifferent parts of an elephant in the 
dark, the resu lts seem quite encouraging as long as one takes into 
account their complexity and  interdependence (table 1 and  appendix 
A). 
                                                          
2
 The WGI as a set of the aggregate ind icators rely on the GCS and the EIU among the 
others. 
8 
Table 1 Concepts, questions and  definitions 
Governance 
feature 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (WGI) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report (GCS) 
Economist Intelligence Unit‘s 
Risk Briefing assessments 
(EIU) 
Definition of 
governance 
Traditions and 
institutions by 
which authority in 
a country is 
exercised  
Legal and  
administrative 
framework within 
which ind ividuals, 
firms, and  
governments 
interact to generate 
wealth 
- 
Government 
effectiveness 
The quality of 
public services, 
the capacity of the 
civil service and 
its independence 
from political 
pressures; the 
quality of policy 
formulation and 
implementation, 
and  the cred ibility 
of the 
government's 
commitment to 
such policies 
- Wastefulness of 
government 
spending 
- Burden of 
government 
regulation 
- Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
settling d isputes 
- Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
challenging 
regulations 
- Transparency of 
government 
policymaking 
- Is the government likely to 
open, liberal and pro-
business policies for 
nationals and  foreigners? 
- What is the quality of the 
bureaucracy in terms of 
overall competency/  
training, morale/  ded ication?  
-How pervasive is red  tape?  
- How pervasive is 
corruption?  
- How accountable are public 
officials?  
- Is there a risk that this 
country could  be accused  of 
human rights abuses? 
Regulatory 
quality 
The ability of the 
government to 
provide sound 
policies and  
regulations that 
enable and 
promote private 
sector 
development 
- - Is the tax regime clear and  
pred ictable?  
- What is the risk that 
corporations will face 
d iscriminatory taxes?  
- What is the risk from 
retroactive taxation? 
- What is the risk of 
d iscriminatory tariffs?  
- What is the risk of excessive 
protection (tariff and  non-
tariff) in the next two years? 
Control of 
corruption 
The extent to 
which public 
power is exercised  
for private gain, 
including both 
corruption and 
―capture‖ of the 
state 
- Diversion of 
public funds 
- Public trust of 
politicians 
- Irregular 
payments and 
bribes 
- 
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One can see from comparisons in table 1 that the limits of all categories 
are highly ambiguous and  could  lead  to confusion. Marks of 
government (in)effectiveness in the GCS could  be compared  with the 
regulatory quality in terms of the WGI, while the EIU‘s assessment of 
the government effectiveness includes human rights, bureaucratic 
competency, red  tape, corruption, and  accountability all at once. Some 
questions for the ind ivid ual ind icators are excessively precise (for 
example, the GCS d istinguishes seven types of bribes), some others, 
however, are rather vague (e.g. ―How accountable are public officials?‖ 
in the EIU). 
The second  conceptual problem refers to the idea that Putnam et al. 
(1993) state as ―d ifferent governments might be simply good  at 
d ifferent things.‖ Concentrating only on government effectiveness o r 
control of corruption would  be by no means enough for a full analysis; 
one should  not skip any of the governance features. Moreover, it might 
be necessary to keep in mind  possible existence of some other 
governance features, not listed  explicitly in the institutional indexes. 
Comparing two or more d imensions of governance gives some insights 
about possible internal factors that might affect the country‘s 
institutional quality (figure 1). On the one hand , there are some ou tliers 
scoring relatively well for  one feature of governance but not for the 
others. For instance, Bhutan was assessed  much higher for government 
effectiveness and  political stability than for regu latory quality and  
accountability over the whole period . On the other hand , clear 
improvement or worsening of the institutional quality in general cou ld  
be seen only in few cases. More often, the countries manage to improve 
certain aspects of governance, while having a little success in the other 
aspects. 
The last method ological problem occurs here. Since the ind icators 
certainly measure d ifferent things with d ifferent methods, it might well 
be that only the most evid ent cases receive reliable scores. That is: in 
those cases where many ind icators agree on a country‘s institu tional 
quality, it happens because its improvement or worsening is 
unquestionable. However, for many other countries fallen ―in the 
middle,‖ the scores and  ranks are somewhat relative that cou ld  make 
any d irect country comparisons vague and  d isputable. For this matter, 
for instance, the au thors of the WGI, beside the estimation of 
governance ind icators, report also the margins of error, highlighting 
their importance. While taking this into account, many significant 
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differences among countries can in fact be assessed  using these 
ind icators (Kaufmann et al., 2010). It is, therefore, preferable using the 
WGI instead  of either alternative. In add ition to its growing policy 
relevance (World  Bank, 2000), it d isplays reasonable reliability and  has 
a broad  coverage, avoid ing sample selection problems at the country-
level (Kurtz and  Schrank, 2007). 
Figure 1 Scores for government effectiveness and  regulatory quality 
from the WGI in 1996 and  2010 
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2.3 Globalization: terms, factors, indicators 
Globalization may be defined  as a process, a historical period , or as a 
political and  economic phenomenon. 
In the first understand ing, globalization reveals itself through a variety 
of links and  interconnections between the states. ―It defines a process 
through which events, decisions and  activities in one part of the world  
can come to have a significant consequence for ind ividuals and  
communities in quite d istant parts of the globe‖ (McGrew, 1990). This 
view is shared  by many scholars, defining globalization as a set of 
―processes deriving from the changing character of the goods and  
assets that comprise the base of the international political economy‖ 
(Cerny, 1995: 596). 
In the second  understand ing, the term ‗globalization‘ might serve for 
describing a context in which events occur (Reich, 1998). The 
globalization period  might be described  as one that began in the mid -
1970s
3
. Other interpretations date globalization from the end  of the 
1970s and  the beginning of the 1980s, because of a series of events that 
clustered  within a limited  time period : spread  of technologies, 
international debt crises, the second  oil crisis; rise in inflation rates; rise 
of capital movement, etc.
4
 
Finally, globalization is most often characterized  as a complex system 
of political and  economic phenomena. These include d iffusion of 
technology, moving of production and  capital, integration of cap ital 
markets, and  the changes in the international d ivision of labour (Reich, 
1998). All these phenomena certainly have had  historical precedents ; 
nonetheless, these events have no preceden ts in terms of speed  and  
intensity. Globalization thus characterizes the escalation of existing 
processes rather than the d evelopment of a new one (Reich, 1998).  
Such intensification creates new challenges and  opportunities for 
international and  domestic actors, as well as for the states (Jones, 1995). 
The impact of globalization varies across countries, depending on 
many socio-economic factors. Great expectations about global political 
convergence based  on liberal democratic institutions across nations 
(Fukuyama, 1992; Mandelbaum, 2005) d id  not fully come into reality. 
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 For d iscussion, see Hirst, P. and  Thompson, G. (1996). Globalization in Question: The 
International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
4
 For d iscussion on this view, see Solomon, R. (1994). The Transformation of the World 
Economy, 1980–1993. London: MacMillan. 
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However, there is some evidence in support of the neoliberal concep t of 
globalization, which expects that the countries would  redefine their 
national interests to achieve greater openness to the world  economy 
(Ohmae, 1991; Friedman, 2005; Rode and  Gwartney, 2012). Critique of 
globalization regards some undesired  consequences of such openness, 
includ ing the increase of poverty and  socio-economic d ivisions 
(Murphy, 2001), cultural conflicts and  ethnic nationalism (Mansfield  
and  Snyder, 2007), and  rise of protectionist policies (Stalling s, 1995; 
Mansfield  and  Milner, 1997; Helleiner and  Pickel, 2005). Such 
consequences were especially evident in the less developed  countries, 
as globalization cou ld  undermine national sovereignty in various areas, 
from finance to labour mobility (Strange, 1996).  
To analyse the effect and  consequences of globalization, most stud ies 
use various economic ind icators, which allow reliable cross-country 
comparisons. Such ind icators include: 
- Foreign d irect investment inflows (Blomström et al., 1994; Garrett, 
2001; Borensztein et al., 1998; Carkovic and  Levine, 2002), 
- International trade flows (Frankel and  Romer, 1996; Dollar and  Kraay, 
2004; Greenaway et al., 1999), and  
- Measures of openness of trade (Dollar, 1992) and  of capital (Chand a, 
2005; Rodrik, 1998; Alesina et al., 1994). 
While those ind ividual ind icators might provide a proxy for some sub -
d imensions of globalization, it is necessary to assess several 
globalization factors together, as they are strongly related  to each other. 
For a long time, the only overall–globalization study was the 
Globalization Index by A.T. Kearney/ Foreign Policy Magazine (2002). 
There were several attempts to upd ate this index after 2005, e.g. CSGR 
Globalization Index by the University of Warwick
5
 and  GlobalIndex by 
the TransEurope Research Network
6
. 
Recent KOF Index of Globalization took some of the previous 
approaches, but with improved  method ology and  the expanded  list of 
underlying factors. 
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 CSGR Globalisation Index is used  in Joyce, J. P. (2006). Promises Made, Promises 
Broken: A Model of IMF Program Implementation, Economics and Politics, 18(3): 339-365. 
6
 The authors describe GlobalIndex in Raab, M., Ruland , M., Schönberger, B., Blossfeld , 
H., Hofäcker, D., Buchholz, S., and  Schmelzer, P. (2008): GlobalIndex – A sociological 
approach to globalization measurement, International Sociology, 23(4): 596-631. 
13 
In the KOF Index of Globalization, globalization is defined  as ―the 
process of creating networks of connections among actors at multi-
continental d istances, med iated  through a variety of flows includ ing 
people, information and  ideas, cap ital and  goods. Globalization is 
conceptualized  as a process that erodes national boundaries, integrates 
national economies, cultures, technologies and  governance, and  
produces complex relations of mutual interdependence‖ (Dreher et al., 
2008). 
The KOF Index of Globalization takes account of economic, social, and  
political globalization (see Appendix C for details). Economic 
globalization is measured  by trade, foreign investment, as well as the 
tariff restrictions. Social globalization, meaning movement of ideas, 
information, and  people, is estimated , among other factors, by tourism, 
foreign population, use of the Internet, and  the number of both 
McDonald‘s restaurants and  Ikea  stores. Political globalization is meant 
to approximate political cooperation and  is measured  by such factors, 
as the number of embassies and  membership  of international 
organizations (Dreher et al., 2008). 
2.4 Bureaucracy and globalization 
Each state reacts to globalization in its own, national-specific way. 
Underlying factors for the reaction m ight include the level of social and  
political development, structure of industries, as well as cultural, 
educational, and  ethnic structure of the society. Among all the factors, 
quality of institutions is of a great importance. Implementation and  
enforcement of regulations can become a crucial factor for a foreign or 
domestic investor, tourist, trader, or migrant. 
Since the 1980s, the value of world  trade has increased  enormously and  
industrial capital has become unconditionally globalized  (Ruggie, 
1995). These factors affected  governments‘ ability to control their 
national financial policies (Ó Riain, 2000). Migration has become a 
significant feature of many open economies (Held  et al., 1999). 
Moreover, globalization has had  some social implications (e.g. in its 
impact on gender equality and  income d istribution groups). 
Some stud ies find  that these changes have undermined  the role of the 
state, replacing or complementing national institutions with global 
norms and  structures (Sklair, 1991; Robinson, 1998; Mittelman, 1997). 
Many scholars, however, pred ict that globalization makes the role of 
the state more important, since effective governance is crucial for 
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national interests w ithin the global order (Cerny, 1995; Rode and  
Gwartney, 2012). The governments med iate the connections between 
the domestic and  global actors, therefore, affecting the way, in which 
the national interests and  assets are used  within the range of 
opportunities available in the global economy (Ó Riain, 2000). 
Globalization might change links and  authority of institutions across 
the levels of governance (Castells, 1997). This would  mean 
reconfiguration of the state and  formation of new relations both 
between states and  the local actors and  between states and  the global 
actors. 
A number of policies and  regulations, used  to p romote domestic 
development, ought to be reshaped  under the impact of globalization. 
Multilateral agreements change tariff rules and  simplify custom 
procedures. Currency unions change monetary policies, banking 
regulations, and  control of capital. Migration changes labour 
regulations and  supports, to some extent, anti-d iscriminatory policies. 
Foreign investment may serve as a stimulus for ad opting more liberal 
financial policies and  even for promoting democratization. The fo rmer 
happens because investors seek for  milder fiscal policies (e.g. in the 
form of tax concessions), which decrease costs for investors, instead  of 
protectionist policies, which increase costs (Bhagwati et al., 1992; 
Brewer, 1993; Ellingsen and  Wärneryd , 1999). Moreover, investors do 
expect that democratic governments can more cred ibly commit to 
market friend ly policies than authoritarian governments can; hence, 
foreign investment could  affect the path of political d evelopment of a 
country and  provide a su pport for democratization reforms (Jensen, 
2008; Bandelj, 2009; but see Rode and  Gwartney, 2012). Some stud ies 
underline the role of foreign capital for democratic transition and  
global integration of a country (Bevan and  Estrin, 2004; Meyer, 1998; 
Schmidt, 1995). Some even argued  that those countries were more 
successful that built ―capitalism from outside‖ (King and  Szelényi, 
2005; Eyal et al., 1998). Some other stud ies, however, demonstrated  
controversial impact of foreign investment. While stimulating a  
country‘s development in a short-run, it could  create dependence on 
foreign capital, curbing the long-run development (Dixon and  Boswell, 
1997; Firebaugh, 1997). 
As all institutional areas are being reshaped  by globalization, there is a 
strong need  in an empirical analysis of those changes and  their 
consequences. Globalization brings to test the strength, autonomy, and  
legitimacy of national institutions. At the same time, institutions 
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determine, to what extent various globalization factors would  be able 
to affect the d omestic order. Their interplay creates a new global order, 
where national-specific norms and  institutions might become more 
important than ever. 
  
16 
3. Globalization and Institutional Quality: A Panel Data Analysis  
3.1 Scope of research 
In Moscow, Russia, the Swedish furniture retailer IKEA was asked  to 
pay a bribe only weeks before the opening of its flagship store in 2000. 
Refusal to pay would  lead  to electricity being shut d own. IKEA 
responded , not by paying the bribe, but by renting d iesel generators 
large enough to power the entire shopping mall. Later, in 2006, it was 
revealed  that the Russian executive hired  to manage the d iesel 
generators for another store, in St. Petersburg, took kickbacks from the 
rental company to inflate the price. IKEA‘s expansion in Russia was 
halted , and  two years later senior executives were d ismissed  for 
allowing bribes. 
The story about IKEA in Russia, told  by among many others The New 
York Times
7
, illustrates important aspects of globalization. Trade and  
foreign d irect investments can potentially improve economic 
development, benefitting both consumers and  cap ital owners. At the 
same time, dysfunctional institutions, such as corrup tion, may thwart 
these potential benefits. The establishment of and  actions taken by  
firms operating in foreign countries may also affect norms and  
behavior. On the one hand , IKEA‘s refusal to pay bribes may facilitate 
the fight against corruption in Russia. On the other hand , the profits 
generated  by IKEA increase the potential gains from engaging in 
corrupt behavior. It is therefore not clear how the degree of corruption 
in Russia would  change as a result of IKEA‘s ventures. More generally, 
little is known about the effects of globalization on institutional quality. 
This part of research aims to shed  light on one particular question: Is 
increasing globalization on average followed  by improving or 
deteriorating institutional quality? 
Changing institutions will generally involve trade-offs between short- 
and  long run benefits. Consequently, the time horizon and  expectations 
of those who influence institutions—executive authorities and  their 
bureaucracies—will be crucial in determining the effects of increased  
globalization. As the time horizon often is determined  by the level of 
economic development, it is important to examine whether the 
globalization effect on institutional quality varies across levels of 
development.  
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 Kramer, A. (2009). Ikea Tries to Build  Public Case Against Russian Corruption. The New 
York Times, September 11, 2009. 
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The analysis employs the World  Bank‘s Worldwide Governance 
Ind icators (WGI) to capture several aspects of institutional qua lity and  
the KOF Globalization Index to measure economic and  social 
globalization. The study also avoids what Blonigen and  Wang (2005) 
call ―inappropriate pooling of wealthy and  poor countries‖ by using 
both sample splits and  interaction effects. Accord ing  to the theoretical 
pred ictions, globalization should  be typically followed  by improved  
institutional quality in rich countries, but in poor countries this 
relationship would  be the opposite. Despite institutions changing 
slowly over time, the d ifference between rich and  poor countries 
should  allow to d raw significant conclusions. 
This chap ter proceeds as follows. The next section d iscusses 
theoretically how globalization and  economic openness is expected  to 
affect institutions and  reviews recent research. Section 3.3 d iscusses the 
measurement of institutions and  presents the data, while section 3.4 
contains the empirical analysis, includ ing several robustness checks 
and  tests of the relationship between globalization and  institutional 
quality across levels of development. Section 3.5 concludes the analysis 
by summarizing the resu lts and  d iscusses how to interpret the find ings.  
3.2 Theoretical framework and previous empirical evidence 
3.2.1 Theoretical expectations 
North (1990) defined  institutions as ―ru les of the game‖ that shape 
human interaction and  argued  that ―third  world  countries are poor 
because the institu tional constraints define a set of payoffs to 
political/ economic activity that does not encourage productive 
activity‖ (North, 1990: 3, 110). A large following literature has 
empirically confirmed  quality of institutions as an important 
determinant of economic growth: Knack and  Keefer (1995), Rodrik et 
al. (2004), Abdiweli (2003) and  Doucouliagos and  Ulubasoglu (2006) to 
mention just a few.
8
 There is no complete agreement on what 
institutions matter the most, though the survey by Durlauf et al. (2005) 
points to low corruption, political stability, property rights , and  ru le of 
law all being important for development. The importance of low 
corruption for growth is also confirmed  by Haggard  and  Tiede (2011). 
As the evidence of the importance of institu tional quality accumulates, 
it is natural to examine if and  how institutions change. Institutions 
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However, Richter and  Timmons (2012) argue that the size of the effect institutions have 
on economic growth is relatively small. 
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shape human interaction, but at the same time institutions  are enforced  
and  upheld  by human interaction. Accord ing to North (1998), 
institutional change is incremental and  occurs when influential agents 
perceive they could  do better by altering the existing institutional 
framework. Typically, institutions are assumed to change slowly over 
time (Acemoglu et al., 2005; Kingston and  Caballero, 2009). 
Nevertheless, as d iscussed  in the previous chapter, there are several 
reasons why increasing globalization may foster institutional change, 
many of which suggest that at least some aspects of globalization 
should  be beneficial for institutional quality.  
A fundamental reason to expect trade and  economic openness to 
improve institu tional quality is Montesquieu‘s idea that market 
interactions act as a civilizing force.
9
 The survey by Hirschman (1982) 
emphasizes that the practice of commercial transactions generates 
feelings of trust and  empathy for others. Later, experimental research in 
East Africa reported  by Ensminger (2004) ind icates a strong 
relationship  between market exchange and  fairness. Ensminger notes 
several possible explanations, such as the idea that people are learning 
in the market that fair-mindedness is rewarded . Another possibility is 
that market experiences help  people learn how to coord inate 
successfully with other anonymous ind ividuals using conventions 
based  on fairness (cf. Young, 1993). 
Differences in institutional quality across countries can also be seen as a 
source of comparative advantage. As d iscussed  in Bergh and  Höijer 
(2008), globalization can increase the competition between countries 
with d ifferent institutions, fostering institu tional reforms in countries 
with low institutional quality. An example is provided  by Al-Marhubi 
(2005), who notes that the cost associated  with bad  policies such as 
unexpected  monetary expansions may be higher (and  the benefits 
smaller) in the countries that are open to world  markets. As a result, 
openness generates incentives to create governance structures such as 
independent central banks and  autonomous tax agencies to free 
monetary policy and  tax collection from political influence. 
Finally, as also d iscussed  by Al-Marhubi (2005), globalization may also 
affect institutions through closer integration and  openness, coming 
with an increasing global flow of information that provides alternative 
sources for knowledge and  ideas. Such information spillovers may 
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 ―[w]herever manners are gentle there is commerce, and  wherever there is commerce, 
manners are gentle‖ (Montesquieu, 1749, as cited  in Hirschman, 1982). 
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make citizens more demanding and  help nurture civil institutions. As 
d iscussed  by Ostrom (2005), the fact that inefficient institutions persist, 
can be partly explained  by people being misinformed or having biased  
view about the outcomes of various institu tional arrangements. Many 
aspects of globalization can potentially mitigate such misinformation 
and  bias, thereby fostering institutional reform. 
While the OECD focu s specifically on citizens‘ role in policymaking 
(OECD, 2009), information spillovers are also likely to affect 
institutional quality in a low -income setting. A recent illustrative 
example is the initiatives to tackle corruption in developing countries 
by encouraging anonymous reports of bribe-paying using public 
websites.
10
 Such activities may improve governance systems and  
procedures and  reduce the scope for corrup tion. 
Other mechanisms d o not necessarily suggest that institutions improve 
as a result of globalization. While generally sympathetic to the idea of 
market integration as a civilizing force, H irschman (1982) also noted  as 
a counteracting force the tendency of commerce to induce an element 
of calcu lation and  instrumental reason in many spheres of life. 
Another likely consequence of globalization is that the d istribution of 
power within countries will change through, for example, the 
transmission of technology (Romer, 1990). Along these lines, Acemoglu 
and  Robinson (2006) show that the trade induced  transfers of skill-
biased  technology increase the income share of the middle class, in turn 
improving their political power and  u ltimately generating better 
protected  property rights. Similarly, Acemoglu et al. (2005a) argue that 
the Atlantic trade strengthened  commercial interests in Western 
Europe.  
Hardy and  Maguire (2008) define institutional entrepreneurs as actors 
who have an interest in particular institu tional arrangements and  who 
leverage resources to create new institutions or to transform existin g 
ones, and  provide several examples of how institutions such as labour 
regulation, entry barriers and  property rights have been changed  as a 
result of such ind ividual initiatives. Importantly, it is not necessarily 
the case that the changes following globalization strengthen the 
incentives for institutional entrepreneurs to improve institutions.  
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 See e.g. www.ipaidabribe.com—a website covering information reported by 
anonymous ind ividuals on when having to pay a bribe in more than 450 Indian cities.  
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Changing institu tions will in many cases involve trade-offs between 
short run and  long run benefits. For example, both violations of rule of 
law  and  of property rights are likely to bring short run gains to those 
involved , while harming the long run economic development. The 
same goes for corruption and  several policy ru les as well, such as 
inflationary monetary policies, which may bring substantial benefits to 
small elite groups in the short run while being devastating for long run 
economic development. 
For this reason, the time horizon and  expectations of those who 
influence institutions will be crucial in determining the effects of 
increased  globalization. Referring again to the case of IKEA in Russia, it 
may well be the case that those who engage in corrupt activity realize 
that corruption is likely to d iminish the long run benefits from having 
IKEA expanding in Russia, but when future benefits are heavily 
d iscounted , the short run benefits of increased  corruption are higher. In 
the latter case, the presence of IKEA creates an incentive for 
bureaucracies to alter institutions in order to easier be able to reap short 
run benefits from corruption, property rights violations, and  similar 
activities. If, however, more weight is put on long run economic 
development, the effect of IKEA would  be to increase the return to 
institutional improvements. 
In poor countries, uncertainty and  instability is typically higher, and  
life expectancy is shorter. Consequently, the incentives to improve 
institutions to foster long run economic development are lower, and  
the incentives to worsen institutions (through, for example, accepting 
corruption) are likely to be higher (see Acemoglu an d  Verd ier, 2000; 
Fjeldstad  and  Tungodden, 2003; and  Altind ag and  Xu, 2009 for further 
d iscussions). Thus, the correlation between globalization and  
subsequent improvements in institutional quality when examined  
using panel d ata with country fixed  effects is expected  to be smaller 
(and  possibly negative) in poor countries than in rich countries.  
3.2.2 Previous studies 
In the wake of increasing globalization, several stud ies have examined 
whether factors such as trade and  economic openness affect 
institutions, especially rule of law and  the level of corruption. Most of 
these stud ies find  a positive effect of openness on institutional quality, 
but none has so far examined  how the effect varies with the level of 
development. 
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Recently, Bhattacharyya (2012) finds a positive effect of openness on 
property rights. Openness is quantified  as the number of years a 
country has been open, as defined  by the Sachs and  Warner openness 
index, updated  by Wacziarg and  Welch (2003). The institutional 
ind icator used  is expropriation risk and  repudiation of contracts as 
measured  by the International Country Risk Guide. The study uses 
panel d ata, covering between 65 and  103 countries from 1980 to 2000. 
Results ind icate that a one sample stand ard  deviation increase in the 
fraction of years a country has remained  open since 1950 leads to a 2.2 
point increase in the property rights institu tions index. To account for 
potential endogeneity, Bhattacharyya (2012) verifies the results by 
instrumenting trade openness using export partners‘ gr owth rate. In a 
limited  sample of 31 countries, he finds a similar relationship between 
tariffs and  executive constraints over the period  1865 to 1940. 
Levchenko (2011) finds that the countries whose exogenous 
geographical characteristics pred ispose them to exporting in so-called  
institutionally intensive sectors have significantly higher institutional 
quality. The conclusion is reached  by pred icting the institutional 
intensity of exports using geographic characteristics and  examining the 
relationship with the rule of law index from Kaufmann et al. (2005) 
averaged  across 1996–2000 for a cross section of 141 countries. 
The Kaufmann ind icators (Kaufmann  et al., 1999, which are the same as 
in Knack and  Keefer, 1995) are also used  by Al-Marhubi (2005), where 
the average of the six d imensions are exp lained  using several ind icators 
of economic openness: trad e flows, the Sachs and  Warner index, the D-
index (Dollar, 1992) and  the fourth d imension of the economic freedom 
index, freedom to trade internationally (Gwartn ey and  Lawson, 2002). 
Regressions includ ing 81 to 125 countries ind icate that openness (all 
measures except the D-index) in 1985 is associated  with improved  
governance in 2000 and  2001. 
A positive relationship is also found  by Wei (2000) using corruption 
(taken from Business International and  Transparency International) 
and  trade flows as a share of GDP in a cross section of 169 countries in 
1978–1980 and  184 countries in 1994–1996. Similar results are reached  
by Bonaglia et al. (2001), who have found  corruption (from 
Transparency International and  International Country Risk Guide) 
being related  to the GDP share of imports in 53 to 119 countries, using 
pooled  OLS regressions for various periods between 1980 and  1998. 
The negative effect of import openness on  corruption is confirmed  by 
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IV-regressions where population, an English -speaking dummy, area, 
and  remoteness are used  as instruments for openness. 
While the stud ies reviewed  above all tend  to find  a positive 
relationship between openness and  institu tional quality, these results 
are not confirmed  by Nicolini and  Paccagnini (2011). Their stud y uses 
political rights and  civil liberties (from Freedom house) as well as trade 
flows/ GDP in a panel d ata setting with 197 countries from 1976 to 2004 
period . Using Granger causality tests, they fail to find  a causal 
relationship between trade and  institu tions in any d irection. Their use 
of yearly d ata is in contrast to other stud ies and  may bias the results 
towards 0 if there are measurement errors in the d ata and  institutions 
change only little from year to year.  
The mechanisms d iscussed  in previous stud ies are similar to those 
described  in section 3.2.1. For example, Bhattacharyya (2012) departs 
from North (1990) by noting that North d oes not mention the impact of 
international trade on technological progress via technology transfer.  
The most theoretically elaborated  paper is Levchenko (2011), where 
institutions play dual roles: they generate rents for some parties within 
the economy and  they are a source of comparative ad vantage in trade. 
The dual role of institutions means that d ifferent consequences of 
increasing trade openness are possible. In technologically similar 
countries, trade will lead  to a ―race to the top‖ in institutional quality 
(similar to the perspective in Bergh and  Höijer, 2008). However, when 
technological d ifferences are bigger, trade flows are d riven by other 
than institutional sources of comparative advantage. In this case, trade 
does not create an incentive to improve institutions but rather increases 
the incentives for the parties earning rents to make institutions worse. 
The empirical results ind icate that institutions d o ind eed  improve as a 
result of trade openness in countries that can expect to capture the 
institutionally intensive sectors after trade opening. The theoretical 
possibility that some countries w ill actually make institutions worse as 
a result of trade openness is not supported  by the empirical analysis. 
Levchenko (2011) suggests that the presence of the OECD countries 
with very high institutional quality means that no other country will 
find  it optimal to reduce its quality of institutions after trade opening.  
3.2.3 Summary 
Research so far lends some support to the view that economic openness 
on average promotes institu tional imp rovement. The results of the most 
23 
recent find ings fit well w ith older stud ies such as Wei (2000) and  
Bonaglia et al. (2001) where more open economies are shown to exhibit 
less corruption. Institutional improvements can therefore be seen as a 
potential mechanism in the empirical relationship between 
globalization and  economic growth (Dreher, 2006; Rode and  Coll, 
2012). 
Several questions are however left open. Previous stud ies, relying on 
cross-sectional variation among countries, do not teach us anything 
about variation over time. Importantly, this also hold s when 
instrumental variables are used  in cross sections. When Levchenko 
(2011) shows that countries, which geographical characteristics 
pred ispose them to export in institutionally intensive sectors , have 
higher institutional quality, this find ing does not imply that an increase 
in trade flows would  be followed  by institutional improvement. 
The two existing panel data stud ies arrive at d ifferent results. 
Bhattacharyya (2012) find s a positive relationship between openness 
and  better protected  are private property, whereas Nicolini and  
Paccagnini (2011) do not find  any relationship between trade and  
institutions using yearly bilateral trade flow data and  the Freedom 
House index for political rights and  civil liberties. Given that 
institutions change slowly over time, the result may be explained  by 
their use of yearly d ata. 
It is also clear from previous research that most of the economic gains 
that can be expected  from institutional improvement d o take some time 
to materialize, while the gains from breaches of contracts, corruption , 
and  other forms of institutional deterioration are more or less 
immed iate for those involved  in these activities. Thus institutions may 
well change for the worse in less developed  countries where the 
bureaucrats who shape institutions have shorter time horizons. So far, 
however, no stud y has noted  that the effect of globalization on 
institutions is likely to depend  on the level of development as 
suggested  by the time horizon argument, and  thus potentially suffers 
from inappropriate pooling of low -income and  high-income countries, 
as d iscussed  by Blonigen and  Wang (2005). 
Finally, the literature on globalization and  institutional quality has so 
far employed  strict economic measures of globalization, such as trade 
flows or the Sachs Warner index that classifies a country as either open 
or not. The process of globalization, however, is a broad  and  
multid imensional phenomenon with economic, social, and  political 
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components (Arribas et al., 2009; Dreher et al., 2008) that may affect 
institutions d ifferently, suggesting that a strict focus on economic 
measures might limit our understand ing of the relationship between 
globalization and  institutional change. 
3.3 Data and methods 
3.3.1 Data on institutional quality and globalization 
Choosing a measure of institutional quality involves several trade -offs. 
For some particular institu tions, such as democracy, data are available 
for all major states since 1800 in the Polity IV Project. Other 
institutional measures are more comprehensive, but cover much fewer 
countries and  years.
11
 Following the d iscussion in the previous chapter, 
the most reliable choice so far is the Worldwide Governance Ind icators 
(WGI) by the World  Bank (Kaufmann  et al., 2010). This dataset captures 
several aspects of institutional quality, begins in 1996 and  covers 
193 countries by 2010, and  has not been used  before in this line of 
research. Inference using year-to-year changes is not advised , but 
averaging over short time periods yields a reasonably comprehensive 
measure of various aspects of institutional quality for both high -income 
and  low-income countries. For a d iscussion on the use of WGI in 
research, see Apaza (2009). 
For interpretation, it is important to know that the WGI compile and  
summarize information from several sources, includ ing both expert 
assessments (such as the World  Bank‘s Country Policy and  Institutional 
Assessment, used  by Chauvet and  Collier, 2008) and  public surveys 
(such as the Afrobarometer surveys). Each source is assigned  to one of 
six aggregate ind icators, which are then averaged  and  made 
comparable across countries using an unobserved  components model 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). The crucial assumption in this procedure is 
that the observed  d ata from each source are a linear function of the 
underlying, unobserved  level of governance.
12
 The six aggregate 
ind icators are government effectiveness, control of corruption, regulatory 
quality, political stability, rule of law, and  voice and accountability. Previous 
stud ies such as Knack and  Keefer (1995) and  Al-Marhubi (2005) use the 
average of these ind icators. The find ings in Haggard  and  Tiede (2011), 
however, suggest that developing countries vary in the way d ifferent 
                                                          
11
 A good collection of available institutional data is accessible through the Quality of 
Governance (QoG) dataset by the University of Gothenburg (Teorell et al., 2011). 
12
 More details are available on http:/ / info.worldbank.org/ governance/ wgi/  
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types of institutional quality are combined . Sp ecifically, they note that a 
large cluster of developing countries combines high corruption levels 
with relatively well functioning property rights, whereas a second  
smaller cluster is worse in both d imensions and  also very violent. For 
the scope of this analysis, it is necessary, therefore, to use these six 
ind icators separately instead  of averaging them. Details of six measures 
and  their sources are presented  in Append ix B. 
As mentioned  above, institutions are typ ically assumed to change 
slowly over time. This seems to be bad  news for poor countries that 
might be stuck with d ysfunctional institutions. But as recently noted  by 
Berggren et al. (2012), institutional ind icators might change a lot over 
time and  the pattern varies substantially between countries . The same 
applies to the sample stud ied  here. Data ind icate notable changes in 
institutional quality, also among the poorest countries.  
Following the d iscussion in the previous chapter, the log of the KOF 
Index of Globalization (Dreher et al., 2008) is used  a measure of 
globalization. Details of the KOF Index and  its sub-components are 
presented  in Appendix C.  
As an illustration, figure 2 plots the change in economic globalization 
as measured  by the KOF Index against the change in government 
effectiveness from the WGI over the period  1996–2009. As expected , the 
scatter plot illustrates that most countries experienced  increasing 
economic globalization over the period . Interestingly, focusing on the 
upper part of the figure shows that a number of countries substantially 
improved  their institutional quality during the same time period .  
Figure 2 suggests a weak positive correlation between globalization 
and  institu tional quality. Variation is however large among 
observations, and  d ifferentiating between rich and  poor countries 
allows seeing a somewhat stronger correlation seeming to exist in high -
income contexts. Furthermore, figure 2 reveals that there are no 
obvious outliers in the sample. 
The baseline specification includes several control variables, all 
suggested  by previous empirical research on the determinants of 
institutional quality. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics on the 
variables of interest.  
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Figure 2 Change in economic globalization and  change in government 
effectiveness for high-income and  low-income countries, 1996-2009 
 
GDP per capita (PPP ad justed , in constant USD), total population (both in 
logs), and  a share of total rent from natural resources in GDP are taken 
from the World  Development Ind icators database (World  Bank, 2010). 
Population is used  as a proxy for country size. While richer countries 
typically have better institutions, the find ings of both Treisman (2000) 
and  Fisman and  Gatti (2002) suggest that country size has the opposite 
effect, presumably due to the d ifficulties in shar ing of power and  
responsibilities between central and  local authorities. Rent from natural 
resources is included  to measure natural resources abundance, found  
associated  with higher levels of corruption by both Ades and  Di Tella 
(1999) and  Treisman (2000), and  also with lower quality of government 
in general by Anthonsen et al. (2012). 
Additional controls are used  as robustness checks, includ ing the log of 
total net development assistance and aid from the WDI, the percentage of 
adult population (age > 15) w ith completed  secondary education (Barro 
and  Lee, 2010), and  the Polity IV  index ranking a country‘s political 
institutions by giving each country a score from -10 to 10, ranging from 
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pure autocracy to consolidated  democracy (Marshall and  Jaggers, 
2012). 
Table 2 Descrip tive statistics 
Variable Mean Std . 
dev. 
n N Min Max Source 
Government 
effectiveness 
-0.06 1 191 752 -2.32 2.30 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Control of 
corruption 
-0.06 1 191 752 -1.92 2.51 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Political stability -0.05 1 193 758 -3.23 1.64 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Regulatory quality -0.07 1 191 752 -2.53 2.16 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Rule of law -0.07 1 193 763 -2.53 1.96 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Voice and  
accountability 
-0.04 1 193 769 -2.22 1.67 Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (2011) 
Log of Economic 
globalization 
3.99 0.35 148 739 2.31 4.58 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Economic 
globalization: 
Flows 
4.00 0.41 173 864 2.21 4.61 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Economic 
globalization: 
Restrictions 
3.95 0.46 137 684 1.60 4.57 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Social 
globalization 
3.67 0.55 183 912 1.82 4.53 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Social 
globalization: 
Personal contacts 
3.80 0.54 179 892 1.85 4.59 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Social 
globalization: 
Information flows 
3.96 0.47 175 872 1.48 4.60 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of Social 
globalization: 
Cultural proximity 
2.78 1.28 190 947 0.69 4.59 Dreher et al. 
(2008), updated in 
2012 
Log of GDP per 
capita, PPP 
8.49 1.29 168 868 5.25 11.18 World  
Development 
Ind icators (2012) 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Variable Mean Std . 
dev. 
n N Min Max Source 
Log of Population 
size 
15.46 2.10 190 945 9.72 21.00 World  
Development 
Ind icators (2012) 
Total natural 
resources rent (% 
of GDP) 
9.06 17.16 185 922 0 164.95 World  
Development 
Ind icators (2012) 
Percentage of 
population (age 
15+) with 
completed 
secondary 
education 
20.56 13.53 142 710 0.60 67.79 Barro and Lee 
(2010) 
Log of Net 
development 
assistance and  aid  
19.03 1.55 139 774 12.61 23.19 World  
Development 
Ind icators (2012) 
Revised  combined 
Polity IV score 
3.02 6.57 159 791 -10 10 Marshall and  
Jaggers (2012) 
3.3.2 Method 
The relationship between globalization and  institu tional quality is 
examined  with the following equation  
 IQ
it
 = α
i
 + β
i
G
it-1
 + γ
i
X
it-1
 + u
it
 (1) 
where IQ stands for institu tional quality, G is globalization, X  refers to 
a set of controls, and  u
it
 is the error term. To account for unobservable 
heterogeneity potentially correlated  with the explanatory variables, 
country fixed  effects are included , and  a rand om effects model is used  
for a robustness check.
13
 
The model is estimated  using four year averages over five periods: 
1992–1995, 1996–1999, 2000–2003, 2004–2007, and  2008–2010. Averages 
are used  to minimize the effects of noise and  single year fluctuations in 
the data. To mitigate potential endogeneity, independent variables are 
lagged , so that average globalization from 1992–1995 is used  to explain 
institutional quality over 1996–1999. The only variable that is used  with 
its actual values is a share of population with second ary education, as 
this data only covers the years 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, and  2010. To 
enhance comparability across d ifferent specifications, the sample is 
                                                          
13
 The main specification does not include time fixed effects as shocks simultaneously 
affecting institutional quality in several countries are unlikely. When including time fixed  
effects, time dummies are not jointly significant at trad itional levels. 
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restricted  across the models of the same specification, thus, the effective 
sample is limited  by data availability.  
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Main results 
Tables 3 and  4 present fixed  effects estimation results for the 
relationship between economic and  social globalization and  the six 
d imensions of institutional quality, using the full sample.  
Economic globalization seems to be followed  by improving institutions, 
with four out of six d imensions reaching statistical significance at least 
at the ten per cent level. In contrast, the estimates for social 
globalization are small and  never significant. The control variables 
generally have the expected  sign, w ith population size and  rents from 
natural resources being negatively related  to institutional quality. 
 
Table 3 Economic globalization: baseline models; full sample  
Variables Govern-
ment Ef-
fective-
ness (GE) 
Control of 
Cor-
ruption 
(CC) 
Regu-
latory 
Quality 
(RQ) 
Voice and  
Account-
ability 
(VA) 
Rule of 
Law 
(RL) 
Political 
Stability 
(PS) 
Economic 
Globalization 
0.114 0.113 0.262 0.304 0.208 0.248 
(1.49) (1.19) (2.84)*** (3.22)*** (2.54)** (1.73)* 
Population -0.468 -0.253 -0.622 -0.082 -0.354 -0.232 
(4.08)*** (1.78)* (4.50)*** (0.58) (2.88)*** (1.08) 
GDP per 
Capita, PPP 
0.266 -0.023 0.057 -0.168 0.073 0.025 
(3.91)*** (0.27) (0.69) (2.01)** (1) (0.2) 
Total natural 
resources rents 
-0.002 -0.005 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.002 
(0.7) (1.79)* (1.62) (2.04)** (2.17)** (0.43) 
Constant 4.715 3.543 8.473 1.323 4.012 2.251 
 (2.66)*** (1.62) (3.98)*** (0.61) (2.12)** (0.68) 
Observations 392 392 392 392 392 392 
Number of 
countries 
101 101 101 101 101 101 
R-squared 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.91 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 4 Social globalization: baseline models; full sample 
Variables GE CC RQ VA RL PS 
Social 
Globalization 
0.04 -0.088 0.066 -0.005 -0.097 -0.179 
(0.54) (0.94) (0.73) (0.05) (1.21) (1.29) 
Population -0.295 0.06 -0.314 0.207 -0.017 0.219 
(2.56)** (0.41) (2.24)** (1.43) (0.14) (1.02) 
GDP per Capita, 
PPP 
0.284 0.053 0.135 -0.046 0.209 0.215 
(4.29)*** (0.64) (1.68)* (0.55) (2.93)*** (1.75)* 
Total natural 
resources rents 
-0.003 -0.008 -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 -0.002 
(1.72)* (3.12)*** (1.81)* (2.65)*** (3.18)*** (0.66) 
Constant 2.041 -1.376 3.573 -3.188 -1.393 -4.986 
(1.16) (0.62) (1.66)* (1.44) (0.73) (1.52) 
Observations 417 417 417 417 417 417 
Number of 
countries 
109 109 109 109 109 109 
R-squared 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.96 0.91 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
To allow for d ifferent effects in developed  and  developing countries, 
the full sample in d ivided  into sub-samples of high-income and  low-
income countries (with the threshold  at GDP per capita of 4000 US 
dollars). Moreover, to gain deeper knowledge on what globalization 
factors affect institutional quality, the economic and  social globalization 
measures should  be d isaggregated . Tables 5 and  6 present the effects of 
five types of globalization on six d imensions of institu tional quality , for 
low-income and  high-income countries separately. 
The results reveal some patterns that are not visible in the pooled  
sample. First, economic flows correlate with worsened  institutions in 
low-income countries, with significant effects for government 
effectiveness and  control of corruption. For rich countries, the sign is 
the opposite for all d imensions, and  significantly so for government 
effectiveness, control of corruption , and  political stability.  
Secondly, the personal contacts as a part of social globalization 
correlate negatively with institutional quality in low -income countries, 
but not in high-income countries. 
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Table 5 Different types of globalization; sub-sample of low -income 
countries  
(controls are included  but not shown) 
Variables GE CC RQ VA RL PS 
Economic Flows -0.154 -0.24 -0.114 -0.033 -0.073 -0.075 
(2.10)** (2.75)*** (1.49) (0.35) (0.92) (0.51) 
Number of Countries 60 60 60 60 60 60 
R-squared 0.88 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.90 0.84 
Economic Restrictions 0.275 0.227 0.28 0.334 0.353 0.581 
(3.24)*** (2.25)** (3.13)*** (3.26)*** (4.15)*** (3.51)*** 
Number of Countries 52 52 52 52 52 52 
R-squared 0.89 0.81 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.85 
Personal Contacts -0.191 -0.47 -0.124 -0.488 -0.278 -0.533 
(1.35) (2.81)*** (0.81) (2.82)*** (1.87)* (1.95)* 
Number of Countries 59 59 59 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.88 0.8 0.89 0.91 0.90 0.86 
Information Flows 0.035 -0.12 0.04 0.008 -0.081 -0.14 
(0.56) (1.62) (0.6) (0.1) (1.2) (1.12) 
Number of Countries 59 59 59 59 59 59 
R-squared 0.89 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.85 
Cultural Proximity 0.032 -0.009 -0.021 -0.066 -0.037 -0.061 
(0.85) (0.19) (0.51) (1.4) (0.91) (0.81) 
Number of Countries 61 61 61 61 61 61 
R-squared 0.89 0.80 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.85 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Third ly, both cultural proximity and  information flows are followed  by 
institutional improvements, often with significant effects, in high-
income countries but not in low -income countries. Finally, more liberal 
trade policies (as measured  by the economic restrictions d imension of 
the KOF Index) correlate with better institutions in low -income 
countries, but not so in high-income countries. 
Running separate regressions for low -income and  high-income 
countries d rastically changes the results, in line with the theoretical 
expectations, d iscussed  above. In particular the positive relationship 
between economic globalization and  institutional quality in the 
baseline analysis seems to be fully d riven by the relationship  in richer 
countries. Similarly, social globalization improves institutional quality 
in high-income countries d uring the time period  stud ied . On the other 
hand , economic globalization is not correlated  with institutional quality 
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in the less developed  context, and  social globalization is negative and  
significant for four out of six institutional measures.  
Table 6 Different types of globalization; sub-sample of high-income 
countries  
(controls are included  but not shown) 
Variables GE CC RQ VA RL PS 
Economic Flows 0.218 0.2 0.147 0.077 0.096 0.214 
(2.96)*** (1.93)* (1.25) (0.8) (1.14) (1.72)* 
Number of Countries 46 46 46 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.98 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.94 
Economic Restrictions -0.07 -0.084 0.302 0.001 -0.165 -0.099 
(0.64) (0.57) (1.93)* (0.01) (1.4) (0.58) 
Number of Countries 44 44 44 44 44 44 
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.95 
Personal Contacts 0.077 0.285 -0.033 0.42 -0.013 0.395 
(0.35) (0.93) (0.1) (1.58) (0.06) (1.15) 
Number of Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95 
Information Flows 0.212 0.466 0.098 0.201 0.122 0.185 
(2.20)** (3.61)*** (0.7) (1.72)* (1.18) (1.24) 
Number of Countries 47 47 47 47 47 47 
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95 
Cultural Proximity 0.066 0.066 0.032 0.101 0.028 0.096 
(2.46)** (1.78)* (0.8) (3.15)*** (0.97) (2.29)** 
Number of Countries 48 48 48 48 48 48 
R-squared 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.95 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
In short, only liberalization of economic restrictions seems to do more 
good  to institutions in low -income countries than in high-income 
countries. The other four aspects of globalization all capture some kind  
of human interaction such as trade, foreign investment, tourism, 
cultural integration, and  surfing the Internet. To the extent that 
increases in these activities affect institutions, it leads to improvements 
in high-income countries and  to worse institutions in low -income 
countries. This is very much in line with the prior theoretical 
arguments and  suggests that the results in previous stud ies using 
samples includ ing rich and  poor countries together should  be 
interpreted  with care. 
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3.4.2 Robustness tests 
The robustness of the resu lts is verified  with a number of add itional 
control variables used  in the empirical literature on institutional 
change: Political regime, represented  by the Polity IV score, the share o f 
adult population with completed  second ary education and  total net 
development assistance and  aid . 
The main d ifference between rich and  poor countries remains when 
includ ing these variables (results are not reported  but available from 
the au thor). As expected , Polity IV score is not significant given that it 
changes little over time. Education has a significant negative effect on 
political stability but is otherwise not significant. Most interestingly, aid  
is typically positive and  significant, suggesting either that aid  improves 
institutional quality or that more aid  is given to those countries where 
institutions are improving. Previous find ings have associated  aid  with 
a decline in institutional quality (Brau tigam and  Knack, 2004) or found  
it having only a small impact on institutional change (Knack, 2004). 
This impact might also depend  on the mode of aid  (Selaya and  Thiele, 
2012). However, accord ing to Wright (2009), there are factors that might 
intervene in the aid -institu tions relationship, causing aid  to improve a 
country‘s accountability. 
In the main analysis, the strategy to identify d ifferences between rich 
and  poor countries is to d ivide the full sample. A d ifferent strategy is to 
include an interaction term between globalization and  GDP. Doing so 
improves the power of the estimations and  allows us to calculate the 
marginal effect of globalization on institutional quality at d ifferent 
levels of GDP per cap ita. Figure 3 illustrates the marginal effect of 
globalization on control of corruption conditional on the value of 
logged  GDP per capita, and  confidence intervals at 95 per cent. Once 
again the pattern found  in the baseline analysis is confirmed: Economic 
globalization is followed  by improved  (here: less corrupted) 
institutions in rich bu t not in poor countries. Social globalization 
however seems to worsen institutions in poor but not in rich countries.  
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Figure 3 The marginal effect of economic and  social globalization on 
control of corrup tion at d ifferent levels of GPD per cap ita  
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3.5 Concluding discussion 
In 1749 Montesquieu suggested  that market interactions might act as a 
civilizing force. Following his line of reasoning, the establishment of 
the Swedish furniture retailer IKEA in Russia in 2000 could  affect 
norms and  behaviour in such manner that  ensu ing firms establishing in 
the country would  not have to share similar experiences with bribes 
and  corruption. If this held  true globally, it would  be welcome news for 
developing countries. Sad ly however, this seems not to be the case. 
Researchers have recently started  to empirically examine the 
relationship between economic globalization and  institutional quality. 
The existing literature does however not consider that the relationship 
between globalization and  institutional change may d iffer across 
contexts of development. This research complements this new and  
growing literature on openness and  institutional quality, by argu ing 
that state executives and  their bureaucracies are likely to have d ifferent 
time horizons in low -income and  high-income countries. As a result, 
increasing economic and  social interactions following with 
globalization are likely to affect institutions d ifferently depending on 
the level of development. 
Using a panel dataset based  on the Worldwide Governance Ind icators, 
this study uncovered  a heterogeneous effect of globalization on 
institutions, especially for the control of corruption measure. Most 
notably, the control of corruption seems to worsen when less 
developed  countries trade more, while this is not the case in high -
income countries. Similarly, more social interaction across national 
borders seems to worsen institutional quality in low -income contexts, 
but not so when the level of economic development is higher. 
In contrast, more liberal trade policies seem to bring about positive 
institutional change in low -income countries, suggesting that the new 
set of constraints and  new rules are more important than more 
economic transactions in this context. 
Three major conclusions can be made from this analysis. First, the 
globalization process is ind eed  multid imensional and  d ifferent parts of 
the process (and  their specific character) seem to affect institutions very 
d ifferently. Second , d ifferent types of institutions seem to d iffer in how 
easily they respond  to the new state of affairs that follows with more 
globalization. For example, although both the rule of law ind icator and  
the control of corruption ind icator capture how well citizens and  the 
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state respect institutions that govern economic and  social interactions 
among them, it is mainly control of corruption that is affected  by the 
globalization process in  this setting. Third , in line with the theoretical 
pred ictions, globalization affects institutions d ifferently depending on 
the country‘s level of development. The empirical results thus suggest 
that the previous find ings on positive effects of economic flows on 
institutional quality are likely d riven by changes in rich countries.  
Theoretical expectation that d ifferences in time horizon causes 
institutional entrepreneurs to react d ifferently to increasing 
globalization is thus supported . But what are the exact mechanisms 
explaining these heterogeneous effects of globalization? A suggestion 
for future research would  be to investigate the role of education, 
political participation, and  democratic institutions. 
In less democratic low -income countries, political power is often 
concentrated  in the hands of an economic elite, for example, the major 
producers and  investors in the economy. In this case, the short time 
horizon argument app lies, and  social and  economic globalization does 
not provide strong incentives to improve property rights for the whole 
economy (i.e. for those market actors who d o not belong to the elite) or 
to reduce corruption by altering the existing framework. As d iscussed  
by Acemoglu (2008), the economic elite protect their property rights 
and  ensure that they do not fear expropriation, but this type of 
organization also typ ically enable the elite to get a monopoly position 
for themselves and  exclude others to take ad vantage of profit 
opportunities, in essence violating the property rights of future 
potential producers.  
In more democratic countries, things might be d ifferent but not 
necessarily so. The effect of globalization on institutions in democracies 
will depend  on the degree to which people vote and  demand  
accountability of local and  national politicians. Again, time horizon is 
likely to matter, both d irectly and  ind irectly via the ed ucation channel. 
As shown by e.g. Campante and  Chor (2011), there is a robust link 
between ind ividual schooling and  political participation. On average, 
schooling is lower in developing countries both as a result of poverty 
but also due to shorter time horizons: as shown by Jayachandran and 
Lleras-Muney (2009), low life expectancy lowers the value of human 
capital investments. 
Examining the consequences of globalization on the world‘s poor is 
understand ably a vivid  research area. For example, Bergh and  Nilsson 
37 
(2010) have demonstrated , also using the KOF Index of Globalization, 
that both economic and  social globalization are positively related  to life 
expectancy, and  that this relationship  holds also when rich countries 
are excluded  from the sample. In contrast, the results of this study 
rather suggest that globalization such as trade and  tourism bring 
benefits to institutional quality in rich countries but not in poor  ones. 
Thus, there are many reasons to focus future research on the links from 
various forms of globalization to social norms and  institutions in 
developing countries.  
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4. Fiscal Incentives and Foreign Direct Investment: A Causal 
Inference Approach 
4.1 Scope of research 
In the past several decades, many governments at national and  sub -
national levels in Europe, America, and  Asia have sought to attract 
foreign d irect investm ent (FDI) by setting up investment promotion 
agencies and  offering various fiscal incentives (UNCTAD, 2000; 
OECD, 2003). While policymakers believe tax incentives help to attract 
FDI, multinational enterprise managers do not typ ically rank taxes as 
very important for investment decisions in their survey responses 
(Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2012). Such incongruence of beliefs and  
perceptions is puzzling. Further add ing confusion to the puzzle is the 
fact that, after some mixed  find ings on taxation and  FDI in the early 
empirical stud ies from 1950s to 1990s, a large bod y of econometric 
stud ies in the past decade appear to reach the consensus that lower tax 
rates encourage FDI (Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2012; Hines, 1999; 
Devereux, 2006; De Mooij and  Ederveen, 2008).  
This study offers another empirical analysis of the question whether tax 
concession causes more FDI. In particular, this research addresses three 
weaknesses from the previous stud ies. First, most empirical stud ies 
focus on the national level tax rates, but in many countries, tax rates on 
corporate profit are often affected  by sub-national governments as well. 
Ignoring sub-national d ifferences in corporate tax rates leads to 
measurement error in the tax variable and  biased  estimates. Secondly, 
many empirical stud ies pool together very d ifferent countries, whose 
unobservable heterogeneity tends to bias the estimated  effect of tax rate 
on FDI. Third ly, existing econometric stud ies focus on estimating 
correlation between tax rate and  FDI, rather than identify ing the causal 
effect of tax incentives on FDI. The solution to these three points is to 
apply the causal inference approach to a natural experiment scenario 
within a single country where regional governments at one point have 
been granted  autonomy to cut corporate profit tax. The research seeks 
to prod uce more cred ible estimates of the causal effect of tax concession 
on FDI. 
Russian regions after the year 2002 provide the ideal setting for such an 
analysis. It was the first time the federal government gave  regional 
governments the autonomy to reduce their part of corporate profit tax. 
The 82 Russian regional governments adopted  three d ifferent corporate 
profit tax regimes: a status quo flat rate, tax concessions for investment 
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profit, and  tax concessions for the profit from important investment 
projects. This exogenously imposed  autonomy allows test ing the causal 
effects of d ifferent tax concessions on FDI across regions within a single 
country over time.  
Two causal inference techniques are applied : a parametric 
identification strategy, based  on d ifferences in d ifferences (DID) 
estimation, and  a non-parametric identification strategy, based  on 
synthetic controls method .  
This chapter proceed s as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief overview 
of the empirical literature on tax and  FDI. Section 4.3 d iscusses why 
Russian regions provide an ideal natural experiment case. Section  4.4 
presents the parametric id entification strategy and  the results for the 
DID analysis. Section 4.5 d iscusses the non-parametric identification 
strategy and  the results from synthetic control method . Section 4.6 
concludes.  
4.2 Review of literature on fiscal incentives and FDI 
Many scholars provide extensive reviews of stud ies on the topic (see, 
e.g., Tavares-Lehmann et al., 2012; Hines, 1996; Devereux, 2006; De 
Mooij and  Ederveen, 2008). Empirical stud ies typ ically regress a 
measure of foreign investment on some tax variable(s) while 
controlling for other factors affecting investment. As noted  in some 
surveys of the literature, these stu d ies d iffer in various respects. The 
dependent variable is often FDI flow s, FDI stock, the number of foreign 
locations, or investment in property, plant, and  equipment. The tax 
variables also d iffer across stud ies, includ ing statutory tax rate, tax 
base, average tax rate, effective tax rate, effective marginal tax rate, 
effective average tax rate, and  bilateral corporate effective tax rates. The 
design could  be time series, cross-sectional, and  panels, and  could  be at 
firm, industry, sub-national, country, and  bilateral levels. Stud ies from 
earlier decades tend  to reach mixed  find ings regard ing the impact of 
corporate taxes on FDI, but most recent research (e.g., 
Becker et al., 2012; Bellak and  Leibrecht, 2009; Bellak et al., 2009; 
Blonigen and  Davies, 2004; Egger et al., 2009; Grubert and  Mutti, 2004) 
tends to find  that corporate taxes have significant effects on FDI.  
As noted  earlier, most of the extant stud ies tend  to focus on national 
corporate tax rates and  pool heterogeneous countries together in their  
samples. Only a very small number of stud ies examine the impact of 
corporate taxes by sub-national governments on FDI. For example, 
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Bartik (1985), Slemrod  (1990), Papke (1991), and  Hines (1996) examine 
how state-level corporate income taxes affect FDI allocation 
(investment and / or plant location) among 50 US states. Swenson (1994) 
stud ies how average tax rates affect aggregate FDI inflows in 18 
d ifferent industries into 50 US states in the period  1979–1991. 
Becker et al. (2012) study the effect of business tax rates by German 
municipalities on location decisions of multinational companies. Since 
in many countries, other than the USA and  Germany, sub-national 
governments have some au tonomy levying taxes on corporations, more 
research is in order to study the impact of tax policies of regional 
governments on FDI. Focusing on within -country variations hold s 
constant the unobserved  heterogeneity between countries that tends to 
bias the estimated  effect of tax on FDI, thus isolating the effect of 
interest. 
More importantly, extant empirical stud ies largely estimate the 
correlation between tax and  FDI and  have little confidence in claiming 
and  find ing the causal effect of tax on FDI. It has been demonstrated  
that policy evaluation based  on conventional regression m odels 
without addressing causal inference issues is most likely to generate 
biased  estimates (Abad ie et al., 2010; Abadie and  Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Abadie, 2004; Rubin, 1977; Holland , 1986; Angrist and  Pischke, 2008). 
This study takes advantage of recent progress in the causal inference 
methods to provide better estimates of the causal effect of tax 
concession on FDI. 
4.3 Effect of tax concession on FDI in Russian regions: a natural experiment 
design 
This research aims to explain how tax concessions for investment profit 
might influence FDI inflows in Russian regions. The dependent 
variable is the amount of foreign d irect investment inflows into a 
Russian region in a given year, measured  in 2000 constant dollars and  
log transformed  (figure 4). Data are from Fed eral Statistic Service of 
Russia (Rosstat)
14
. Foreign investment refers to the investment of 
foreign capital into the objects of entrepreneurial activity, as well as 
other kinds of property and  intellectual values, includ ing services and  
information. The FDI data reflect a d irect-investor ownership of at least 
10 per cent of the ord inary shares in the equity capital of an enterprise, 
                                                          
14
 FDI Data are reported  by both Rosstat and  the Bank of Russia in accordance with the 
methodology set out by the International Monetary Fund, but only Rosstat offers the data 
d isaggregated  by regions and  by sectors. 
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resident in Russia, by a d irect investor, resident of a foreign country. 
Direct investment can be in form of equity capital, r einvested  earnings, 
intra-company loans, and  financial leasing.  
Figure 4 FDI inflows in Russian regions in 2002 and  2008 
 
FDI comprises not only the initial transaction establishing the 
relationship between an investor and  an enterprise, but also all 
subsequent transactions between them; however, it does not include 
investment made in monetary institutions and  banks (for statistical 
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purposes, the latter is included  into other foreign investment)
15
. Figure 
4 maps the intensity of FDI inflows in 82 Russian regions. It is 
interesting to note the striking increase of FDI inflows in some regions 
between the years 2002 and  2008. 
The tax variable under stud y is the corporate profit tax rate. Changes in 
corporate profit tax in Russian regions with the new Tax Code in 2002 
provide a natural experiment to evaluate the causal effect of tax 
concession on FDI inflows. As in many other countries, Russian profit 
tax is the tax on the income of legal entities, imposed  on net annual 
profits. The revenues from profit tax are one of the main sources of the 
regional budgets revenues, making for 20 up to 70 per cent of their non -
transferable income. All other taxes existing in Russia are either low 
(hence, insignificant for the regional tax revenues), either imposed  at 
the federal level (so that the regional au thorities do not have any power 
over the tax rates). Even though corporate profit tax rate in Russia had  
both a federal and  a regional component, setting the rates for both 
components was trad itionally the prerogative of the federal 
government. But the Russian Tax Code, which entered  into force in 
2002, introduced  a new regime for corporate profit tax: The regions 
were given the autonomy to reduce the regional part of the profit tax 
rate. With this newly granted  power, the Ru ssian regions experimented  
with three types of profit tax regimes: a flat rate for corporate profit tax 
in general, tax concessions for d irect investment profit, and  tax 
concessions for profit from important investment projects. Table 7 
presents more detailed  information about these profit tax rates in 80 
Russian regions from 1992 to 2010. 
Table 7 Tax rates on investment profit in Russian regions, per cent  
Number of 
regions 
Group 1992-
1993 
1994-
2001 
2002 2003 2004 2005-
2008 
2009-
2010 
37 Green 32 35 24 24 24 24 20 
9 Orange1 32 35 24 24 20 to 
22.5 
20 to 22 15.5 to 
17.5 
1 Orange2 32 35 24 24 24 23.5 19 
25 Yellow1 32 35 24 24 20 to 
23.5 
19.5 to 
23 
15 to 
18.5 
8 Yellow2 32 35 24 24 24 20 15.5 
                                                          
15
 Meyer and  Pind  (1999) and  Vinhas de Souza (2008) address the issue of low reliability 
of Russian statistics on FDI in details. Some methodology comparisons are presented  also 
in Foreign direct investment statistics: how countries measure FDI 2001. (2003). Washington, 
D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
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Based  on the total profit tax rates, table 7 categorizes 80 Russian 
regions, exclud ing two outliers (Kaliningrad  Oblast and  Jewish 
Autonomous Oblast), into three groups, labelled  with d ifferent colours 
henceforth for simplifying references within this research .  
Green regions have only one flat tax rate, following the federal 
decisions about its decrease. Orange regions keep the standard  tax rates 
at the same level as green regions but introduce tax concessions for 
investment projects. Yellow regions also keep the standard  tax rates at 
the same level as green and  orange regions bu t introd uce tax 
concessions for so-called  ―important investment projects.‖  
The regional tax concessions, which occurred  in some regions but not 
in others during the period  2002–2008, provide an ideal case for testing 
their causal effect on FDI. The sample design is based  on the following 
reasoning.  
Over time, the federal part of the tax rate rose and  shrank, whereas the 
regional part increased  stead ily since 2003, but the total rate was the 
same during 2002-2008, an important fact for the research design.  
The total tax rate for profit, though changed  before 2002 and  in 2009, 
was stable at 24 per cent d uring 2002–2008. Thus, this study focuses on 
the period  2002–2008, which allows hold ing constant the total tax rate 
for profit and  evaluating precisely the effect of the fiscal policy shock 
implemented  at the regional level regard ing investment profit in 2003.  
The control group in the analysis is green regions. Their tax rate on 
profit from d irect investment stayed  at 24 per cent from 2002 to 2008, 
even when regions were allowed  to lower their tax rates. It is worth 
noting three regions are excluded  from the green group, namely  
Moscow City, Moscow Oblast, and  Chechen Republic, because they are 
outliers in many of their attributes, rendering incompara ble 
comparisons. Hence, the pool of green regions includes 34 regions. 
The first treatment group  is orange regions. An investor in such a 
region is eligible for the reduced  tax rate for the net income received  
from d irect investment. Note here that nine regions (referred  to as 
―orange1‖ in table 7) decrease their tax rates for investment profit in 
2003 (entered  into force in 2004), so that their total tax rates were placed  
somewhere between 20 and  22.5 per cent. Orange2 includes one region 
(Buryatia Republic), which has implemented  its tax concession not  in 
2003 but in 2004 (entered  into force in 2005). Since the tax concession in 
Buryatia is likely to be influenced  by other regions and  thus 
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endogenous, the treatment group includes only nine orange1 regions 
that implemented  tax concession simultaneously as soon as they were 
able to d o so. 
The second  treatment group is yellow regions. These thirty -three 
regions have the same total rate for corporate profit as the green 
regions, but they decrease the tax rate for so-called  important 
investment projects. If an investor receives an approval by the regional 
government to be included  in the list of investment projects considered 
important for regional development, he/ she becomes eligible to app ly 
the reduced  tax rate on investment profit. Since there are no common 
criteria for ―importance‖ of investment projects, each regional 
administration selects them independently. This p rovides regional 
bureaucracy with a great d eal of d iscretionary decision -making power. 
Based  on the timing of tax policy change, this group is also d ivided  into 
two types (referred  to as ―yellow1‖ and  ―yellow2‖ in table 7). Yellow1 
consists of 25 regions that lowered  their rates for important investment 
projects in 2003 (entered  into force in 2004), so that the total tax rates 
were placed  somewhere between 20 and  23.5 per cent. Yellow2 consists 
of eight regions that lowered  their rates for important investment 
projects in various years later than 2004, probably influenced  by 
changes in other regions. In the further analysis, the second  treatment 
group includes only 25 yellow1 regions that implemented  tax 
concession simultaneously as soon as they were able to do so. 
Now one may wonder whether the treatment regions are 
geographically clustered . Append ix D maps the geographical locations 
of the three key groups: green1 (control), orange1 (treatment  group 1), 
and  yellow1 (treatment group 2). It shows little evidence that either 
orange or yellow regions are geographically clustered , though they 
tend  to be located  in the Western part of Russia.  
To further ensure that the control and  treatment regions were similar in 
other various d imensions before regional tax concessions in 2003, the 
d ifference of means is tested  between green and  yellow/ orange regions 
with respect to FDI inflows, GRP growth rate, regional budget deficit, 
and  number of public officials per capita
16
. None of the tests shows a 
significant d ifference between control and  treatment regions. Figure 5 
                                                          
16
 A detailed  description of the covariates is provided  in the following section. Regional 
deficit is obtained  as follows: Regional budget revenue – (Budgetary transfers from 
federal budget + Regional budget expenses). Data are in million US dollars (logged) and 
come from the Rosstat‘s dataset. 
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shows the box p lots for each variable for green, orange, and  yellow 
regions. 
Figure 5 Balance of relevant covariates between treatment and  control 
groups in the pre-treatment period  
 
Note: t-tests show that d ifferences in means are not statistically d ifferent from zero. 
The d istributions of FDI inflows, economic growth, regional budget 
deficit, and  the per capita number of public officials are very similar in 
the pre-treatment period  between treatment (orange and  yellow) and  
control regions. There is little evidence that orange and  yellow regions 
implemented  tax concessions to catch up with green regions, or that 
green regions faced  more budgetary constraints such that they could  
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not cut tax, or that institutional capacity was very d ifferent when tax 
concession was adopted  in some regions but not in others. Hence, the 
treatment and  control regions are quite balanced  in the pre-treatment 
period . 
4.4 Parametric identification strategy 
4.4.1 Difference in differences estimation 
In comparative stud ies, researchers compare the units exposed  to the 
treatment w ith one or more unexposed  units (Abadie et al., 2010). 
While estimating the effect of tax concession on FDI, one faces the 
fundamental problem of causal inference: the impossibility of 
observing the counterfactual, i.e., the outcome for the same unit in t he 
absence of the treatment. Ideally, to overcome this problem, one would  
conduct an experiment in which tax concessions are rand omly assigned  
to the Russian regions. The d ifference between the average level of FDI 
for the treated  regions and  the average level of FDI for the control 
group  would  constitute the causal effect of the tax concession. This is 
because both groups would  be comparable with respect to 
(un)observed  confounders. Of course, in reality, tax concessions are 
never completely rand omly assigned  to the regions. If confronted  with 
non-rand om assignment, causal inference methods serve to overcome 
the obstacles to estimating causal effects (Rubin, 1974, 1977; Holland , 
1986; Angrist and  Pischke, 2008). 
The d ifference in d ifferences estimation (henceforth DID) allows 
approximating rand omization by design and  generating causal 
inference. Within the DID framework as d iscussed  in Angrist and  
Pischke (2008), the estimation can take the following form in the 
context of FDI and  tax concession between one treatment and  one 
control group. 
                                                   (2) 
where        denotes observed  FDI inflow in region i and  period  t,     
denotes random error,        ind icates a dummy for the treatment 
region,    denotes the time-invariant region fixed  effect in the absence 
of a tax concession,      denotes a time dummy that equals one after 
tax cut is introduced ,    denotes the tax cut year fixed  effect common 
among regions, and                denotes the interaction term  
between treatment regions that implement tax concessions at some 
point and  the tax cut year dummy. In this setup,    denotes the 
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difference in d ifferences effect of interest, i.e. the effect of tax 
concessions on FDI. 
The setup in equation 2, when applied  to Russian regions in this 
analysis, requires several modifications. First, there are many regions 
within each group  (both treatment and  control) tha t have unobserved  
heterogeneity to control for. Hence, a fixed  effect dummy for each 
region    is included  instead  of          .17 Second , instead  of one tax 
cut year, there are multiple years, as each year might have had  a 
specific effect common to all regions. Hence, a year fixed  effect dummy 
for each year    is included  instead  of       .18 Third , there are two 
d ifferent types of tax concessions implemented  by Russian regions in 
2003. Hence, the effects of two concession types should  be estimated  
separately. Specifically, OrangeCut is a dummy that scores one for those 
regions that cut tax on investment profit in 2003 and  zero otherwise. 
YellowCut is a dummy that scores one for those regions that cut tax on 
profit from important investment projects in 2003 and  zero otherwise. 
Their coefficients represent the tax concession effect on FDI in this 
setting. Finally, one should  control for observed  covariates, which have 
been commonly found  to affect FDI. Such covariates not only control 
for compositional effects but also improve the precision of the 
estimates. Thus, the DID regression model is defined  as follows:  
                                                          
                          (3) 
To account for various confounding factors, several control variables 
are included , namely GRP per capita, population, trade, real economic 
growth, natural resources potential, investment risk, number of public 
officials per cap ita, political stability, special economic zone, labour 
cost, human capital, spatial correlation, and  lagged  dependent variable. 
Time-varying covariates are lagged  by one year to avoid  the post -
treatment bias. 
Gross regional product (GRP) per capita, measured  in 2000 constant USD 
and  log transformed, ind icates the level of economic development in a 
region for a given year. The variable logged  population accounts for 
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 Hausman test shows that region fixed  effects are more preferable than region random 
effects. 
18
 Wald test confirms that year fixed effects are necessary in some models. 
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regional market size, often an important d river in attracting FDI, and  
also serves as a proxy for regional labour force (Ahrend , 2000; 
Ledyaeva, 2007). The variable trade, measured  as the logged  sum of 
import to and  export from a region, controls for the effect of trade on 
FDI, which could  be positive (e.g., intra-firm trade) or negative (e.g., 
tariff jumping investment). The variable real economic growth (GRP 
Growth) is another trad itional measure of regional economic 
development. Data for these variables come from the Rosstat dataset.  
FDI often depends on the presence of natural resources that has been 
found  significant in some previous stud ies (Asiedu  and  Lien, 2011; 
Kayam, Hisarciklilar, and  Yabrukov, 2007). To control for it, there is 
regional rating of natural resources potential, compiled  by the Russian 
rating agency "Expert." Another control ind icator is ranking of 
investment risks relative to the Russian average, compiled  by the same 
agency. Both variables range from 1 to 82, with 1 being the best rank, 
thus both variables are expected  to have a negative sign
19
. 
The number of public officials per capita is included  as a simplified  proxy 
for bureaucratic quality of regions. Inflated  public ad ministration often 
associates w ith higher administrative burdens and  is expected  to 
d iscourage foreign investors. Data on number of public officials come 
from the Rosstat d ataset. The analysis also employs a proxy of political 
stability in a region, measured  as the governor' s tenure in office. Longer 
governor tenure is associated  with more stable and  pred ictable 
institutional policy, attracting more investment inflows. This variable 
was calculated  by the author. 
Another control variable is a dummy for so-called  Special Economic 
Zones (SEZ). Special Economic Zones were created  in some regions over 
years in form of ind ustrial areas, tourism zones, and  innovation parks. 
The residents of a SEZ receive tax holid ays for the first 10–15 years of 
their activity and  pay zero import tariffs. SEZ are expected  to attract 
foreign companies, hence this dummy should  have a positive sign
20
. 
This variable was calculated  by the au thor .  
The model also includes an average nominal wage per capita and  a share 
of employed with secondary education in total employment. As Broad man 
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 It is worth noting that both rating were widely used in some previous stud ies, but often 
found  insignificant (see Broadman and Recanatini (2001) for d iscussion). 
20
 It is necessary to keep in mind , though, that most of the SEZ were established  in 2006-
2007 and  they became fully functional in 2009-2010, thus, their actual impact might be 
beyond the period  under study. 
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and  Recanatini (2001) argue, both the cost and  the quality of labour 
may be key factors in attracting investment. Under assumption that the 
investors seek for lower labour costs and  for high-skilled  workers, 
nominal wage is expected  to be negatively linked  to investment, while 
a share of employed  with higher education should  have a positive 
impact on FDI. Data for these two variables come from the Rosstat 
dataset. 
As d iscussed  earlier, no pattern of spatial correlation of FDI flows 
among regions is observed  visually from figure 4. Nonetheless, 
conservative estimate should  include a spatial lag of FDI. Specifically, 
the lagged  dependent variable is multiplied  by a connectivity matrix 
that captures contiguity among all the Russian regions in the sample. 
Concretely, the connectivity matrix has ones for those regions that 
share the border and  zeros for those regions that do not. This variable 
controls for the fact that FDI migh t be geographically clustered . The 
lagged  dependent variable in the spatial lag (rather than modelling a 
simultaneous effect of FDI) allows avoid ing endogeneity in estimating 
such a model (Beck et al., 2006). Descriptive statistics on the variables of 
interest as well as their sources is presented  in table 8
21
.  
Because FDI tends to have inertia, the model includes the lagged  
dependent variable on the right hand  side to control for temporal 
dependence. Note that using both the lagged  dependent variable and  
region fixed  effects on the right hand -side would  make OLS estimates 
biased  (Nickell, 1981). Hence, the Arellano-Bover/ Blundell-Bond  
system GMM estimator applies. It employs the moment conditions of 
lagged  levels as instruments for the d ifferenced  equation together with 
the moment conditions of lagged  d ifferences as instruments for the 
level equation. The Arellano-Bover/ Blundell-Bond  estimator allows 
also to identify the effects of time invariant variable, provides a larger 
set of moment conditions both to overcome some weak instrument 
biases of first d ifferenced  estimators and  to reduce the finite sample 
bias in panels with short T and  persistent regressors, and  addresses the 
endogeneity of various variables with appropriate instruments. In 
particu lar, the lagged  dependent variable, per capita GRP, trade 
openness, real economic growth, spatial lag, share of public officials, 
and  investment risk are all treated  as end ogenous and  all other 
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 Kamchatka Krai in 2005 is the only outlier in the sample accord ing to the Cook's D 
value. Removing it does not change the results. 
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covariates as exogenous22. Robust stand ard  errors are estimated  to 
correct for heteroskedasticity (Roodman, 2009)23.  
Table 8 Descrip tive statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std .dev. Min Max Source 
FDI flows 1159 9.18 2.50 0.10 16.38 Rosstat (2012) 
Orange regions 1722 0.04 0.19 0 1 Author‘s 
calculations 
Yellow regions 1722 0.10 0.30 0 1 Author‘s 
calculations 
GRP per capita 1292 7.69 0.81 5.35 10.66 Rosstat (2012) 
GRP growth 1209 2.85 1.31 -4.46 5.26 Rosstat (2012) 
Population 1712 7.16 0.85 3.89 9.35 Rosstat (2012) 
Trade  1116 6.49 1.79 0.10 12.37 Rosstat (2012) 
Rating of natural 
resources potential 
1230 41.50 23.68 1.00 82.00 Rating agency 
Expert (2012) 
Rating of investment 
risk 
1230 41.50 23.68 1.00 82.00 Rating agency 
Expert (2012) 
Length of governor's 
stay in power 
1312 6.26 4.39 1.00 20.00 Authors' 
calculations 
Public officials per 
capita 
1299 0.01 0.01 0.004 0.06 Rosstat (2012) 
SEZ 1312 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 Author‘s 
calculations 
Spatial lag 1312 43.26 22.82 0.00 111.00 Author‘s 
calculations 
Nominal wage per 
capita 
1710 5.16 0.99 2.42 7.91 Rosstat (2012) 
Employed  with 
secondary education  
1185 21.05 5.68 7.30 51.20 Rosstat (2012) 
 
DID estimation identifies a causal effect if and  only if the parallel 
trends assumption hold s. That is, the average outcomes for treatment 
and  control groups should  follow a parallel trend  over time. Only then 
one can use the observable d ifference in outcomes for the control group 
as the counterfactual for the treatment group. In the absence of a 
proper test for the parallel trend  assumption, region -specific time 
trends are included  on the right hand-side for some models to check if 
the coefficients change (Angrist and  Pischke, 2008: 238).  
                                                          
22
 Variance inflation factor (VIF) statistics show no concern for multicollinearity. 
23
 Breusch-Pagan test shows that it is necessary to correct for heteroskedastacity. 
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4.4.2 Results of the difference in differences estimation 
Table 9 shows the DID estimation results. For the system GMM 
estimator to be valid , two assumptions and  d iagnostic tests are 
important. First, for the instruments to be valid , the error term should  
be free from serial correlation. With first d ifferencing in the system 
GMM, in order for the moment conditions to be valid , the d ifferenced  
errors should  be serially correlated  at order one, but not at any higher 
order. Hence, the AR(1) and  AR(2) tests in first d ifferenced  residuals 
are important. Second , an assumption underlying the valid ity of the 
system GMM estimates is that the instruments are exogenous. The 
Sargen/ Hansen overidentification restriction tests allow test ing the 
joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid  and  uncorrelated  
with the error term, and  that the excluded  instruments are correctly 
excluded . Resu lts for both tests in table 9 suggest that serial correlation 
and  instrument exogeneity are reassuring. 
The first two columns in table 9 report the estimates of the sample with 
all Russian regions for which data are available, with varying number 
of control variables. The coefficients of both OrangeCut and  YellowCut 
are positive, though only the former ones are statistically significant at 
the conventional level. Thus, preliminary evidence suggests that tax 
concessions for investment profit increase FDI inflows, but that tax 
concessions for profits from only important investment projects do not. 
Table 9 Difference in d ifferences estimation based  on GMM model 
Variables (1) FDI (2) FDI (3) FDI (4) FDI (5) FDI (6) FDI 
OrangeCut 0.68* 0.76* 0.66 0.72* 1.18* 1.20* 
(0.39) (0.39) (0.42) (0.42) (0.71) (0.71) 
YellowCut 0.40 0.45 0.21 0.28 0.84 0.86 
(0.33) (0.32) (0.35) (0.35) (0.67) (0.68) 
Lagged  FDI 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08 -0.06 -0.06 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
GRP per capita -0.22 -0.26 0.21 0.32 1.92 2.11 
(0.88) (0.86) (1.11) (1.11) (1.90) (1.99) 
Population 6.09 5.42 4.93 3.07 89.49 89.83 
(9.57) (9.56) (11.24) (10.83) (62.58) (61.95) 
Trade -0.64** -0.63** -0.65** -0.66** -0.51 -0.52 
(0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.35) 
GRP Growth 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.12 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.15) (0.15) 
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Table 9 (cont.) 
Variables (1) FDI (2) FDI (3) FDI (4) FDI (5) FDI (6) FDI 
Rating of 
natural 
resources 
0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.06 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Public officials 
per capita 
307.10** 307.43** 349.16** 347.09** 337.22 321.63 
(134.40) (134.69) (170.37) (169.36) (347.89) (334.63) 
SEZ -0.02 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.34 0.34 
(0.41) (0.42) (0.45) (0.46) (0.54) (0.54) 
Rating of 
investment risk 
-0.01** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.02** -0.02** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Spatial lag -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Length of 
governor's stay 
in power 
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.00 -0.00 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
Nominal wage 
per capita 
 0.01  0.02  0.02 
 (0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03) 
Employed  with 
secondary 
education 
 0.00  -0.01  -0.01 
 (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.02) 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(1) 
0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00** 
Arellano-Bond 
test for AR(2) 
0.17 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.5 0.61 
Sargan-Hansen 
test -- χ
2
 
53.97 47.31 31.75 29.85 11.60 5.67 
Dropping 
regions 
no no yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region-specific 
Time Trends 
no no no no yes yes 
Observations 458 458 378 378 378 378 
Number of id  69 69 56 56 56 56 
Robust standard  errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The χ2 test is not statistically significant at the conventional level, showing that the 
models are not over-identified  
Models (3) and  (4) show the results with both outliers and  the regions, 
which implemented  tax concessions after 2004, d ropped . Exclud ing 
these regions allows assessing that the results are neither d riven by 
outliers nor by the regions, which fiscal policy could  have been 
influenced  by some other regions that introd uced  tax concessions 
earlier. The effect of OrangeCut and  YellowCut is positive in both 
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models, but only the effect of OrangeCut in Model (4) is statistically 
significant. 
Models (5) and  (6) show the results when controlled  for region-specific 
time trends. As noted , includ ing such trend s is a way to check whether 
the parallel-trend  assumption holds. Coefficients for both OrangeCut 
and  YellowCut are positive, but only the former ones are statistically 
significant.  
The resu lts allow  conclud ing that tax concession for investment profit 
causes significantly more FDI inflows, but that tax concession for 
selective important investment projects d oes not. The important new 
find ing is that not all tax concessions increase FDI inflows. These 
results are robust regard less of whether the sample is restricted  or not 
and  regard less of control for region-specific time trends. How large is 
the substantive effect of tax concession on investment profit? With the 
coefficient estimate of model 6 (1.2) being the most reliable estimate, tax 
concession for investment profit increases FDI inflows by 232 per cent. 
This estimate is very close to the semi-elasticity estimates in the 
previous empirical stud ies.  
Only a few control variables turn  out to be statistically significant in the 
models. This is in line with previous stud ies on FDI in Russia (Strasky 
and  Pashinova, 2012). In add ition, it is also consistent with the earlier 
d iscussion that the regions between treatment and  control groups 
appear to be roughly balanced  on many d imensions. 
To further ensure the valid ity of the find ings in table 9, several p lacebo 
tests are reported  in Appendix E. First, in the baseline model, FDI is 
replaced  with three variables that should  be orthogonal to tax 
concessions: number of suicide in the female urban population, number 
of d ivorce, and  number of marriage. Tax concession should  have no 
effect on such dependent variables. If it does, it would  imply that 
orange and  yellow regions d iffer substantially from the other regions 
that d id  not implement tax concessions. Such social d ifferences 
between treatment and  control groups could  affect both the level of FDI 
and  tax concession, threatening the whole identification strategy. 
Therefore, it is reassuring that both the orange regions treatment and  
the yellow regions treatment are never statistically significant at the 
conventional level. Second , both treatments are replaced  with two 
dummies that score one respectively for orange regions and  yellow 
regions in pre-treatment periods and  zeros for all the other regions and  
in the years 2004–2008. Such dummies are commonly referred  as leads 
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in the econometrics literatu re. Again these two variables do not have a 
statistically significant effect. 
Note that the lagged  dependent variable is never statistically 
significant. The main mod els are thus recreated  without lagged  FDI, 
using Driscoll-Kraay stand ard  errors to control for spatial correlation 
and  first order autocorrelation (Appendix F). Results of this 
specification are similar to those reported  in table 9. 
4.5 Non-parametric identification strategy 
4.5.1 Synthetic controls method 
DID estimation is ―based  on the presumption of time-invariant (or 
group-invariant) omitted  variables‖ (Angrist and  Pischke, 2008: 243). 
For many causal questions, includ ing the scope of this research , the 
idea that omitted  variables are time-invariant is not always plausible. 
Although the specification above includes a lagged  dependent variable, 
as well as both region and  year fixed  effects, conditions for consistent 
estimates of such models are quite demanding (Angrist and  Pischke, 
2008: 245). This section complements the parametric estimation with 
the synthetic control method —a non-parametric estimation technique, 
which allows build ing a more cred ible counter-factual (Abadie and  
Gardeazabal, 2003; Abad ie, 2004). The synthetic controls method  was 
pioneered  by Abadie and  Gardeazabal (2003) in a study on terrorism in 
the Basque Country and  further developed  by Abadie  et al. (2010). The 
idea behind  synthetic controls method  is a simple one: a combination of 
control units often provid es a better comparison for the treated  unit 
than any single unit alone. In other words, a synthetic controls 
approach allows build ing a more cred ible counterfactual to test the 
effect of tax concession on FDI inflows.  
The synthetic controls method  works by testing whether tax concession 
implemented  by a region i in 2003 leads to a larger inflow of FDI in the 
years 2004-2008 compared  to the similar Russian regions that d id  not 
implement any tax concession. Because comparison units are meant to 
approximate the counterfactual without the treatment, it is important to 
restrict the donor pool to regions with outcomes that are thought to be 
d riven by the same structural process as the treatment regions but that 
were not subject to structural shocks to the outcome variable during the 
period  of stud y (Abad ie et al., 2012). The comparison regions, which 
constitute the synthetic control group, are selected  using an algorithm 
based  on their similarity to the treated  region i before the treatment, 
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both with respect to confounding factors and  past level of FDI. In other 
words, ―the synthetic control algorithm estimates the missing 
counterfactual as a weighted  average of the outcomes of potential 
controls‖ (Billmeier and  Nannicini, 2012: 12). 
Key elements of the estimation are the weights of the synthetic control 
units. Specifically, the synthetic controls algorithm estimates the 
weights in a non-parametric way so that the d istance (or pseud o-
d istance) between the vector of pre-treatment covariates of the treated  
region and  the vector of pre-treatment covariates of the potential 
synthetic control is minimized
24
. For instance, being Amur Oblast the 
treated  region i, the synthetic controls algorithm d etects the closest 
regions to Amur Oblast accord ing to a large number of characteristics 
captured  by the control variables among all regions, which do not 
implement any tax concessions, i.e., green regions. One can then 
compare whether the increase in FDI for Amur Oblast is large 
compared  to the increase in FDI for regions chosen as synthetic control 
units. This proced ure then repeats for all the treated  regions in the 
sample, i.e., for both orange and  yellow groups.  
To build  the synthetic controls group , all control variables, described  in 
the parametric estimation, are approximated  in the pre-treatment 
period . A further covariate privatization is included
25
, which captures 
the number of companies p rivatized  in each region i in year t. Although 
privatization reforms are decid ed  by the federal government, one 
should  make sure that FDI inflows does not increase due to other 
institutional reforms. Importantly, the lagged  dependent variable is 
also included  in the pre-treatment period . Doing so allows isolating 
any anticipatory effects, i.e., those control variables that change in 
anticipation of future tax concessions before such tax concessions are 
actually implemented . All pred ictor variables are averaged  over the 
entire pre-treatment period , from 1995 to 2002.  
Moreover, following Billmeier and  Nannicini (2012), two types of 
experiment are implemented . Type-A experiment restricts the choice of 
                                                          
24
 Following Abadie, Diamond, and  Hainmueller (2010) and  Billmeier and  Nannicini 
(2012), a constrained  quadratic programming routine is used , which finds the best fitting 
W-weights conditional on the regression based  V-matrix. The model relies on a fully 
nested  optimization p rocedure that searches among all (d iagonal) positive semi-definite 
Vmatrices and  sets of W-weights for the best fitting convex combination of the control 
units. 
25
 It is impossible to include this covariate in the DID estimator, since the number of 
observations would  drop substantively. 
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synthetic control units to those regions that are in the same economic 
zone of the treated  unit
26
. The intuition here is to ad just the control unit 
by intentionally pooling the regions with similar characteristics in such 
a way that the pre-treatment variation in the ou tcome would  be 
minimal between the treated  and  control units. The idea behind  the 
type-A experiment is that ―researchers trying to minimize biases 
caused  by interpolating across regions with very d ifferent 
characteristics may restrict the donor pool to regions with similar 
characteristics to the region exposed  to the event or intervention of 
interest‖ (Abadie et al., 2010). 
Type-B experiment uses all the regions in the green group. There is a 
clear trade-off between these two types of experiments. The former 
experiment minimizes the possibility of comparing the treated  units 
with heterogeneous regions, since many confounding factors are likely 
to cluster geographically. The latter experiment increases the sample 
size and  the power of the test. Appendix G lists the regions included  in 
the control group for each treated  unit for both type-A and  type-B 
experiments.  
The synthetic controls approach has three main advantages over DID 
estimation. The first advantage is its transparency since the regions that 
end  up in the counterfactual, as well as their weights, can be easily 
identified . The second  advantage is flexibility since the control group  
can be appropriately restricted  to those regions that are most similar to 
the treatment unit, making the comparison more meaningful than in 
parametric estimation. Third , ―while panel models only control for 
confounding factors that are time invariant (fixed  effect) or share a 
common trend  (d ifference in d ifferences), the model specified  above 
allows the effect of unobservable confound ing factors to vary with 
time‖ (Billmeier and  Nannicini, 2012: 13). 
The synthetic controls method  does not come without shortcoming. As 
Billmeier and  Nannicini (2012: 13) note, the synthetic controls method  
would  still suffer from reverse causation if the timing of tax 
concessions were decided  by expectations on future increase in FDI. 
Although such a possibility exists, the qualitative evidence suggests 
that the timing of the tax reform in 2002–2003 can be considered  
completely exogenous to the level of FDI inflows in Russian regions. 
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 The Russian regions are clustered  geographically into 12 economic zones. The regions 
within each economic zone were explored  at the same time, hence they shared common 
history; they also often have similar climate, transpor t infrastructure, and  industrial mix. 
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What cannot be considered  exogenous is the decision of regions to use 
such a reform to grant tax concession.  
4.5.2 Results of the synthetic controls method 
The results are presented  graphically for both type-A and  type-B 
experiments, primarily for orange regions. Figures 6–8 represent 
graphically the time series of the dependent variable, log of FDI, for the 
treated  unit (solid  line) and  for the synthetic control unit (dashed  line), 
both in the entire pre-treatment period , i.e. 1995–2002, and  in the post-
treatment period , i.e. 2003–2008.  
Appendix H compares the results from type-A and  type-B experiments 
for each treated  region with the constructed  synthetic control. Figure 6 
shows that five orange regions face a substantial increase of FDI 
inflows after tax concession: Amur Oblast, Bryansk Oblast, Rostov 
Oblast, Udmurt Republic, and  Saint Petersburg. Note that for two 
regions, Kabard ino-Balkar Republic and  Republic of Kalmykia, FDI 
data are not available. In sum, for five out of seven regions tax 
concessions lead  to a noteworthy increase of FDI inflow s between 2003 
and  2008.  
Figure 6 shows several informative features. Saint Petersburg and 
Udmurt Republic had  a lower level of FDI compared  to their control 
groups in the pre-treatment period , whereas both orange regions 
caught up first and  then outperformed their control groups in term of 
FDI inflows during the tax concession period . Conversely, Amur 
Oblast, Bryansk Oblast and  Rostov Oblast had  higher level of FDI 
compared  to their control group in 2003, though the gap was minimal, 
and  they further increased  the gap as a result of tax concessions. 
However, Rostov Oblast faced  a stead y decline of FDI post 2007. 
Moreover, for Amur Oblast and  Bryansk Oblast there is evidence of an 
important anticipatory effect already in 2002. Finally, while the 
evidence of an increase of FDI is weak for Chuvash Republic and  Perm 
Krai, their FDI increased  in 2007 and  2008 and  remained  higher than in 
their control groups.  
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Figure 6 Orange regions that attracted  more FDI after tax concession  
 
There are a couple of further considerations worth making. First, all the 
covariates are quite balanced  between the treated  unit and  the control 
group. This is quite evident also from the figures, in which the level of 
FDI is very similar between treated  and  control units in the pre -
treatment period . Second , the root mean square pred iction error 
(RMSPE) is quite low for all seven regions, confirming that the overall 
fit of the models is good . All in all, the synthetic controls analysis seems 
to confirm the results of the DID estimation: tax concession leads to 
more FDI in the orange regions over time. 
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Figure 7 Orange regions that d id  not attract more FDI after tax 
concession 
 
Figure 8 shows ten yellow regions that experience a rise in FDI inflows 
after tax concession: Kaluga Oblast, Khabarovsk Krai, Komi Republic, 
Kurgan Oblast, Leningrad  Oblast, Novosibirsk Oblast, Lipetsk Oblast, 
Pskov Oblast, Republic of Tatarstan, and  Yaroslavl Oblast. However, 
such a positive effect of tax concessions on FDI is not always confirmed  
by both type-A and  type-B experiments. For other 15 regions, there is 
no evidence that tax concessions for ―important investment projects‖ 
have had  any effect on FDI. Note that yellow regions tend  to have 
lower level of FDI compared  to their control group in the pre-treatment 
period , though the gap is quite small. Thus, these regions might have 
used  tax concession to catch up with the other Russian regions.  
All covariates are quite balanced  between the treated  unit s and  the 
control groups and  the RMSPE is quite low. All in all, the synthetic 
controls analysis seems to confirm again the result of the DID 
estimation: tax concession for ―important  investment p rojects‖ has only  
weak impact on FDI in the yellow regions. 
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Figure 8 Yellow regions that attracted  more FDI after tax concession  
 
4.5.3 Main findings 
Given the large number of case stud ies included  in the synthetic control 
analysis, it is worth to further d iscuss the main find ings. In particular, it 
is necessary to highlight some common characteristics of those regions 
that successfully increased  FDI inflows after having implemented  tax 
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concessions. Appendix I summarizes the resu lts for the two groups of 
regions and  report relevant variables, which might have an impact on 
FDI in combination with tax concession. For a given variable x the 
symbol ―‡‖ implies that a region i lays above the mean for that specific 
variable.  
Some variables stand  out as clear intervening factors in attracting FDI. 
Before d iscussing such factors, figures 9 and  10 show the box plots of 
each variable for treated  units and  for the control group. The 
d istributions of treated  and  control units are generally balanced . That is 
crucial for the whole identification strategy, since it mitigates the 
concerns about confounding factors explaining both why FDI inflows 
increase and  why regions decide to implement tax concession. In other 
words, regions, which cut tax rates, are ―as good  as rand omly 
assigned ‖ once conditioned  on control variables.  
Figure 9 Balance of confounding factors for orange regions  
 
Note: t-tests show that d ifferences in mean are not statistically d ifferent from zero 
First, having good  transport infrastructure and  a high percentage of 
urban population seems to be an important intervening factor in 
attracting FDI inflows for both orange and  yellow regions. This is 
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hard ly surprising. Both high level of urbanization and  an extensive 
transport network reduce transport costs and , generally, simplify 
market expansion (Ledyaeva, 2007; Kayam  et al., 2007; Iwasaki and  
Suganuma, 2005; Broadman and  Recanatini, 2001). For instance, the 
regions, which territory lies wholly or partially behind  the Arctic Circle 
(e.g. Republic of Karelia, Komi Republic, Yakutia Republic, and  
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug), face the lack of proper transport 
infrastructure, as build ing of either paved  roads or railways is 
extremely d ifficult in the conditions of permafrost and  ground  ice. 
Moreover, any air connections in these regions interrupt during the 
winter months. Even though these regions are main producers in 
mining ind ustry, especially in oil and  gas extraction, the natural 
resources end owment, apparently, could  not be the only factor to 
attract foreign investment in there in the absence of appropriate 
transport infrastructure.  
Figure 10 Balance of confounding factors for yellow regions 
 
Note: t-tests show that d ifferences in means are not  statistically d ifferent from zero 
Secondly, virtually every region that increased  FDI after tax concession 
has a relatively high share of Russian population. As Broadman and  
Recanatini (2001) point out, the ethnic composition of population might 
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be a proxy for social (in)stability. The higher the ethnic d iversity in a 
region is, the higher the possibility of social conflicts and  violence, 
which might d iscourage foreign investors. 
Third ly, natu ral resources do not appear to matter in attracting FDI for 
those regions that implemented  tax concessions. Indeed , virtually all of 
the orange and  yellow regions, which increase FDI inflows after tax 
concession, have a share of mining industry below mean. This find ing 
is in line with the previous stud ies: Russian FDI inflows are attracted  
mainly by the manufacturing sector and  not by natural resources 
endowment (Vinhas de Souza, 2008; Bradshaw, 1997; Asiedu and  Lien, 
2011; Strasky and  Pashinova, 2012). 
Finally, there is weak evidence that the regions, which increase FDI 
after tax concession, are geographically clustered . This is surely not the 
case for successful orange regions, which are not in the same economic 
zone. Successful yellow regions are also spread-out across the whole 
country, though Northern and  Western regions seem to perform 
between than Southern and  Eastern ones. All in all, there is little 
evidence that FDI are geographically clustered  in Russia, a result 
consistent with the find ing in the parametric estimation as well.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This study applies the causal inference approach to answer the 
question of whether tax concession increases FDI. Even though there is 
a huge body of empirical literature on tax policy and  FDI, their find ings 
have several caveats. This research addresses those weaknesses by 
taking advantage of the exogenously (federally) imposed  fiscal policy 
shock in Russian regions after 2002, treating it as a natural experiment 
and  estimating the causal effect of tax concession on FDI inflows with 
two causal inference techniques: d ifference in d ifferences estimation 
and  synthetic controls method . It further allows investigat ing the 
effects of two d ifferent types of tax concessions: one for investment 
profit and  the other for profit from important investment projects.  
The find ings of this study are interesting and  illuminating. First, using 
the new causal-inference oriented  techniques, the find ing of previous 
stud ies is confirmed: tax concession for investment profit leads to m ore 
FDI inflows. The estimated  size of effect is also consistent w ith the most 
common estimate in the empirical literature. Second  find ing is that not 
all tax concessions increase FDI inflows. Selective tax concession on 
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government sanctioned  important investment projects does not have 
the expected  effect, or the effect is sporad ic and  weak at best.  
These find ings have important implications. Governments that use 
fiscal incentives to attract foreign capital should  be aware that policy 
design matters. Consistent tax concession policies are also transparent 
and  stable and  thus likely to be effective, making the tax concession 
worth the investor's while. On the other hand , when government p icks 
and  chooses winners, it likely introd uces more ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and  rent-seeking behaviour. When government cuts tax selectively, 
investors may not respond  to such often id iosyncratic benefits with 
systematic enthusiasm and  investments.  
One popular view in the fiscal decentralization literature is that 
decentralization empowers sub-national units, increases efficiency in 
allocation of resources, and  lead s to more investment and  faster 
economic performance. The find ings of this stud y spell a cautionary 
tale, offering a conditional view instead . Whether fiscal auton omy leads 
to more attractiveness for international market actors should  depend  
on the type of policy the sub-national government ad opts. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A.  
Table A1. Concepts, questions, and  definitions in ind icators of 
governance quality 
Governance 
feature 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (WGI) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report (GCS) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit‘s Risk Briefing 
assessments (EIU) 
Definition of 
governance 
Traditions and 
institutions by 
which authority in 
a country is 
exercised  
Legal and  
administrative 
framework within 
which ind ividuals, 
firms, and  
governments 
interact to generate 
wealth 
- 
Government 
effectiveness 
The quality of 
public services, the 
capacity of the civil 
service and its 
independence from 
political pressures; 
the quality of policy 
formulation and 
implementation, 
and  the cred ibility 
of the government's 
commitment to 
such policies 
- Wastefulness of 
government 
spending 
- Burden of 
government 
regulation 
- Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
settling d isputes 
- Efficiency of legal 
framework in 
challenging 
regulations 
- Transparency of 
government 
policymaking 
- Is the government likely 
to espouse and  
implement open, liberal 
and  pro-business policies 
for nationals and 
foreigners? 
- What is the quality of 
the bureaucracy in terms 
of overall 
competency/ training; 
morale/ dedication; and  
compensation/ status?  
-How pervasive is red  
tape?  
- How pervasive is 
corruption among public 
officials?  
- How accountable are 
public officials?  
- Is there a risk that this 
country could  be accused  
of serious human rights 
abuses? 
Control of 
corruption 
The extent to which 
public power is 
exercised  for 
private gain, 
including both 
petty and  grand  
forms of 
corruption, as well 
as ―capture‖ of the 
state by elites and  
private interests 
- Diversion of public 
funds 
- Public trust of 
politicians 
- Irregular 
payments and 
bribes 
- 
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Table A1. Concepts, questions, and  definitions in ind icators of 
governance quality(cont.) 
Governance 
feature 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (WGI) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report (GCS) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit‘s Risk Briefing 
assessments (EIU) 
Regulatory 
quality 
The ability of the 
government to 
provide sound 
policies and  
regulations that 
enable and promote 
private sector 
development 
- - Is the tax regime clear 
and  pred ictable?  
- What is the risk that 
corporations will face 
d iscriminatory taxes?  
- Is the corporate tax rate 
low?  
- What is the risk from 
retroactive taxation? 
- What is the risk that the 
country will be subject to 
a trade embargo 
sponsored  either by a 
major international 
organization, a significant 
trad ing partner, or one or 
more of the G8 countries?  
- What is the risk of 
d iscriminatory tariffs?  
- What is the risk of 
excessive protection 
(tariff and  non-tariff) in 
the next two years? 
Source: 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and  Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues. World  Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430. 
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Table A2: Concepts, questions, and  definitions in ind icators of quality 
of democracy 
Governance 
feature 
Worldwide 
Governance 
Ind icators (WGI) 
Global 
Competitiveness 
Report (GCS) 
Economist Intelligence 
Unit‘s Risk Briefing 
assessments (EIU) 
Voice and  
accountability 
The extent to which 
a country‘s citizens 
are able to 
participate in 
selecting their 
government, as well 
as freedom of 
expression, freedom 
of association, and  a 
free media 
- - 
Rule of law The extent to which 
agents have 
confidence in and 
abide by the rules 
of society, including 
the quality of 
contract 
enforcement and  
property rights, the 
police, and  the 
courts, as well as 
the likelihood  of 
crime and violence 
- Property rights 
- Intellectual 
property protection 
- Jud icial 
independence 
- Favoritism in 
decisions of 
government officials 
- How vulnerable is the 
legal process to 
interference or 
d istortion to serve 
particular interests?  
- What is the risk that 
contract rights will not 
be enforced?  
- To what extent is the 
jud icial process speedy 
and  efficient?  
- To what extent do the 
authorities favour 
domestic interests over 
foreign companies in 
legal matters?  
- What is government 
policy on actively 
promoting competition 
and  curbing unfair 
business practices?  
- To what degree are 
private property rights 
guaranteed  and  
protected?  
- What is the risk that 
business financial 
statements are 
inconsistent or 
mislead ing?  
- Are price controls in 
place, and what is the 
risk that these would  be 
extended  in times of 
economic stress? 
68 
Table A2: Concepts, questions, and  definitions in ind icators of quality 
of democracy (cont.) 
Political 
stability and 
absence of 
violence 
The likelihood  that 
the government will 
be destabilized  by 
unconstitutional or 
violent means, 
including terrorism  
- Business costs of 
terrorism  
- Business costs of 
crime and violence 
- Organized  crime 
- Reliability of police 
services 
- What is the risk of 
significant social unrest 
during the next two 
years?  
- How clear, 
established , and  
accepted  are 
constitutional 
mechanisms for the 
orderly transfer of 
power from one 
government to another? 
- Is there a risk that 
international 
d isputes/ tensions will 
negatively affect the 
economy and/ or 
polity? 
Source: 
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., and  Mastruzzi, M. (2010). The Worldwide Governance Indicators: 
Methodology and Analytical Issues. World  Bank Policy Research Working Paper 5430. 
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Appendix C. Sub-d imensions of the KOF Index of Globalization  
Ind ices Weights in total 
A. Economic Globalization  36% 
i) Actual Flows 50% 
Trade (percent of GDP)* 21% 
Foreign Direct Investment, stocks (percent of GDP)* 28% 
Portfolio Investment (percent of GDP)* 24% 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals (percent of GDP)* 27% 
ii) Restrictions 50% 
Hidden Import Barriers 24% 
Mean Tariff Rate 27% 
Taxes on International Trade (percent of current revenue) 26% 
Capital Account Restrictions 23% 
B. Social Globalization  37% 
i) Data on Personal Contact 34% 
Telephone Traffic* 25% 
Transfers (percent of GDP)* 3% 
International Tourism* 26% 
Foreign Population (percent of total population) 21% 
International letters (per capita) 24% 
ii) Data on Information Flows 35% 
Internet Users (per 1000 people)* 33% 
Television (per 1000 people) 36% 
Trade in Newspapers (percent of GDP) 31% 
iii) Data on Cultural Proximity 31% 
Number of McDonald 's Restaurants (per capita) 45% 
Number of Ikea (per capita) 45% 
Trade in books (percent of GDP) 10% 
C. Political Globalization  26% 
Embassies in Country* 25% 
Membership in International Organizations* 28% 
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions* 22% 
International Treaties 26% 
Source: 
Dreher, A. (2006). Does Globalization Affect Growth? Empirical Evidence from a new 
Index, Applied Economics 38(10): 1091-1110. 
Dreher, A., Gaston, N., and Martens, P. (2008). Measuring Globalization - Gauging its 
Consequence, New York: Springer. 
Notes:  
The percentage ind icates the weight used  to derive the indexes of political, economic, and 
social globalization.  
*: These variables have been used in the AT.Kearney/ Foreign Policy Index as well. 
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Appendix E. Placebo Tests 
Variables (7) 
Suicide 
(8) 
Divorce 
(9) 
Marriage 
(10) 
ln(FDI) 
Orange regions 1.90 0.18 0.05  
 (1.31) (0.17) (0.16)  
Yellow regions 0.84 0.02 -0.03  
 (1.06) (0.13) (0.11)  
Orange regions (leads)    -0.68 
    (0.42) 
Yellow regions (leads)    -0.06 
    (0.32) 
Lagged  Suicide 0.07    
 (0.07)    
Lagged  Divorce  0.50***   
  (0.06)   
Lagged  Marriage   0.00  
   (0.06)  
Lagged  ln(FDI)    0.19*** 
    (0.06) 
ln(GRP per capita) 1.99 -0.48* 0.55* 0.03 
 (2.71) (0.26) (0.31) (0.28) 
ln(Population) 6.95 7.16** 1.85 6.79 
 (20.32) (2.95) (1.88) (6.57) 
ln(Trade) 0.25 -0.21*** -0.01 -0.59*** 
 (0.45) (0.05) (0.04) (0.18) 
GRP Growth    0.10 
    (0.08) 
Natural Resources    0.01 
    (0.04) 
Public officials per capita    112.00 
    (132.34) 
SEZ    -0.35 
    (0.54) 
Rating of investment risk    -0.01*** 
    (0.00) 
Spatial lag    0.00 
    (0.02) 
Length of governor's stay in 
power 
   0.02 
   (0.03) 
Secondary education    0.01 
    (0.03) 
Nominal wage per capita     0.00 
    (0.01) 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(1) 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 
Arellano-Bond test for 
AR(2) 
0.56 0.13 0.04** 0.04** 
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Appendix E. Placebo Tests (cont.) 
Variables (7) 
Suicide 
(8) 
Divorce 
(9) 
Marriage 
(10) 
ln(FDI) 
Sargan-Hansen test 54.68 53.92 57.66 26.93 
Observations 439 455 455 540 
Number of id  64 65 65 56 
Notes: All models include region and  year fixed effects. Robust standard e rrors in 
parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The χ
2 
test is not statistically significant at the 
conventional level, showing that our models are not over -identified . 
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Appendix F. Regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard  errors and  first 
order autocorrelation 
VARIABLES (11) FDI (12) FDI (13) FDI (14) FDI (15) FDI (16) FDI 
Orange regions 0.49* 0.51* 0.46 0.52* 1.19* 1.18* 
 (0.22) (0.21) (0.25) (0.24) (0.56) (0.58) 
Yellow region 0.26 0.26 0.15 0.19 0.82*** 0.82*** 
 (0.24) (0.24) (0.26) (0.28) (0.19) (0.21) 
GRP per capita -0.53 -0.46 0.65 0.75 2.97 3.11* 
 (0.38) (0.40) (0.45) (0.46) (1.71) (1.59) 
Population 1.53 0.04 1.22 -1.31 93.72 93.36 
 (3.67) (4.15) (6.53) (8.40) (50.36) (51.04) 
Trade -0.10 -0.11 -0.05 -0.07 0.23 0.22 
 (0.25) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.32) (0.32) 
GRP Growth 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.04 
 (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.11) (0.16) (0.15) 
Natural Resources -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.06 0.06 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
Public officials per 
capita 
327.69*** 339.32*** 456.83*** 471.82*** 402.56** 433.63** 
(75.83) (80.12) (97.32) (100.87) (109.80) (125.73) 
SEZ 0.28 0.26 0.11 0.13 -0.03 -0.05 
 (0.22) (0.22) (0.24) (0.23) (0.45) (0.44) 
Rating of 
investment risk 
-0.01** -0.01** -0.01** -0.01* -0.02 -0.02 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Spatial lag 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.03 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) 
Length of 
governor's stay in 
power 
0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Nominal  wage per 
capita 
 0.03  0.05  0.00 
 (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.07) 
Secondary 
education 
 0.01  0.02  0.01 
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.01) 
Constant 0.00 0.00 -8.89 5.65 0.00 0.00 
 (0.00) (0.00) (47.76) (59.73) (0.00) (0.00) 
Dropping regions no no yes yes yes yes 
Region FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Region-specific 
Time Trends 
no no no no yes yes 
Observations 485 485 395 395 395 395 
Number of groups 74 74 60 60 60 60 
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Appendix G. List of the regions used  as control units for each treated  
region within a relevant economic zone (Experiment A) and  within 
Russia as a whole (Experiment B) 
The regions that have tax concessions for investment (orange group) 
Amur Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.425), Sakhalin Oblast (0.575). Other potential control units 
include: Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Oblast, Primorsky Krai. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.083), Kirov Oblast (0.034), Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.05), Republic 
of Ingushetia (0.138), Sakhalin Oblast (0.407), Zabaykalsky Krai (0.289). 
Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Krasnodar Krai, Ku rsk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, N izhny 
Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, 
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast. 
Bryansk Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Ivanovo Oblast (0.047), 
Ryazan Oblast (0.953). Other potential control units include: Oryol 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tver Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.039), 
Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.001), Ivanovo Oblast (0.225), Kamchatka Krai 
(0.095), Kirov Oblast (0.046), Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.352), Oryol 
Oblast (0.059), Republic of Adygea (0.094), Republic of Ingushetia 
(0.085), Tu la Oblast (0.004). Other potential control units include: 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Krasnod ar Krai, 
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Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Mari El Republic, 
Murmansk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -
Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
Chuvash Republic 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Kirov Oblast (0.327), Mari 
El Republic (0.368), Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.305). 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Belgorod  Oblast (0.23), 
Ivanovo Oblast (0.214), Omsk Oblast (0.056), Oryol Oblast (0.188), 
Republic of Adygea (0.132), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.154), Republic 
of Ingushetia (0.025). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, 
Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, 
Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny 
Novgorod  Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Khakassia, Republic o f 
North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk 
Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Perm Krai 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.706), 
Republic of Bashkortostan (0.294). Other potential control units include: 
Sverd lovsk Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.261), 
Kamchatka Krai (0.128), Krasnod ar Krai (0.008), Murmansk Oblast 
(0.311), N izhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.059), Sakhalin Oblast (0.021), 
Sverd lovsk Oblast (0.212). Other potential control units include: Altai 
Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, 
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Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari 
El Republic, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of 
Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of 
Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Rostov Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Krasnodar Krai (0.641), 
Republic of Adygea (0.304), Republic of Ingushetia (0.055). Other 
potential control units inclu de: Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Belgorod  Oblast (0.056), 
Krasnod ar Krai (0.078), Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.211), Oryol Oblast 
(0.001), Primorsky Krai (0.1), Republic of Adygea (0.204), Republic of 
Ingushetia (0.003), Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (0.001), Sverd lovsk 
Oblast (0.314), Tomsk Oblast (0.033). Other potential control units 
include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, Irku tsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Omsk 
Oblast, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, Ryazan 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
St. Petersburg 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Krasnodar Krai (0.247), 
Primorsky Krai (0.458), Sakhalin Oblast (0.296). Other potential control 
units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Mari El 
Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Oryol Oblast, Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic 
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of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -Alania, 
Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva 
Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Udmurt Republic 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Republic of Bashkortostan 
(1). Other potential control units include: Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Sverd lovsk Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Kirov Oblast (0.051), Mari 
El Republic (0.185), Murmansk Oblast (0.104), Omsk Oblast (0.451), 
Primorsky Krai (0.21). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, Irku tsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Oryol Oblast, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushe tia, 
Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -Alania, Ryazan 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la Oblast, 
Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai.  
 
The regions that have tax concessions for important investment 
(yellow group) 
Altai Republic 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Omsk Oblast (0.518), 
Tomsk Oblast (0.482). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai.  
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.049), Magadan Oblast (0.078), Republic of Ingushetia (0.113), 
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (0.76). Other potential control units 
include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk 
Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-
Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, 
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Kursk Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  
Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of 
Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, Ryazan 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la Oblast, 
Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai.  
Astrakhan Oblast 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Arkhangelsk Oblast (0.25), 
Krasnod ar Krai (0.001), Kursk Oblast (0.001), Omsk Oblast (0.353), 
Republic of Ingushetia (0.021), Sakhalin Oblast (0.2), Tuva Republic 
(0.173). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Belgorod  
Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk 
Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, 
Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, 
Murmansk Oblast, N izhny Novgorod  Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky 
Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of 
Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, 
Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Kaluga Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Oryol Oblast (0.51), Tver 
Oblast (0.49). Other potential control units include: Ivanovo Oblast, 
Ryazan Oblast, Tu la Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.213), 
Krasnod ar Krai (0.298), Republic of Adygea (0.321), Republic of 
Ingushetia (0.011), Sakhalin Oblast (0.157). Other potential control units 
include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka 
Autonomous Okrug, Irku tsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, N izhny 
Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la 
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Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
Kemerovo Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.112), Omsk 
Oblast (0.506), Tomsk Oblast (0.382).  
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.4), 
Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.089), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.235), Republic 
of Khakassia (0.274), Sverd lovsk Oblast (0.002). Other potential control 
units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo  Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, 
Krasnod ar Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Mari El Republic, 
Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol 
Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of Ingushetia, 
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Khabarovsk Krai 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.044), Magadan Oblast (0.499), Primorsky Krai (0.355), 
Sakhalin Oblast (0.101). Other potential control units include: 
Kamchatka Krai. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.202), 
Kamchatka Krai (0.167), Oryol Oblast (0.002), Primorsky Krai (0.569), 
Tomsk Oblast (0.059). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, 
Omsk Oblast, Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic 
of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -Alania, 
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Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin  Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva 
Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Khanty-Mansi Autonomous Okrug-Yugra 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.521), Omsk 
Oblast (0.479). Other potential control units include: Tomsk Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.229), 
Republic of Bashkortostan (0.354), Sakhalin Oblast (0.418). Other 
potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, 
Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, 
Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la 
Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
Komi Republic 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Murmansk Oblast (1). 
Other potential control units include: Arkhangelsk Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Arkhangelsk Oblast (0.001), 
Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.283), Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (0.076), 
Irkutsk Oblast (0.001), Kamchatka Krai (0.171), Krasnod ar Krai (0.001), 
Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.004), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.025), Sakhalin 
Oblast (0.435), Sverd lovsk Oblast (0.001), Zabaykalsky Krai (0.001). 
Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Kursk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, N izhny 
Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, 
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Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula 
Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast. 
Kurgan Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Republic of Bashkortostan 
(1). Other potential control units include: Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Sverd lovsk Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Kamchatka Krai (0.238), 
Omsk Oblast (0.131), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.054), Republic of 
Khakassia (0.287), Tomsk Oblast (0.001), Tuva Republic (0.289). Other 
potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, 
Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Ingushetia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin 
Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Leningrad Oblast 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Krasnodar Krai (0.202), 
Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.02), Primorsky Krai (0.284), Sakhalin 
Oblast (0.393), Sverd lovsk Oblast (0.1). Other potential cont rol units 
include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk 
Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Mar i El Republic, 
Murmansk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Republic of Adygea, 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of 
Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
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Lipetsk Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Kursk Oblast (0.678), 
Voronezh Oblast (0.322). Other potential control units include: 
Belgorod  Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.022), Irkutsk Oblast (0.45), Magadan Oblast (0.016), Omsk 
Oblast (0.287), Tomsk Oblast (0.225). Other potential control units 
include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk 
Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Kar achay-Cherkess Republic, 
Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Mari El 
Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Oryol Oblast, 
Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, 
Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, 
Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Novosibirsk Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.914), Omsk 
Oblast (0.086), Other potential control units include: Tomsk Oblast.  
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.379), 
Krasnod ar Krai (0.327), Magad an Oblast (0.294). Other potential control 
units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, 
Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, 
Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -Alania, Ryazan 
Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la Oblast, 
Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Orenburg Oblast 
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Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.334), 
Republic of Bashkortostan (0.554), Sverd lovsk Oblast (0.112).  
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Belgorod  Oblast (0.413), 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (0.019), Krasnodar Krai (0.39), Kursk 
Oblast (0.115), Omsk Oblast (0.014), Republic of Khakassia (0.049). 
Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, 
Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny 
Novgorod  Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of North 
Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Penza Oblast 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.045), Kirov 
Oblast (0.222), Mari El Republic (0.121), Omsk Oblast (0.267), Oryol 
Oblast (0.212), Tuva Republic (0.134). Other potential control units 
include: Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo  Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Krasnod ar Krai, 
Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, 
Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, 
Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of 
Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin 
Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tver Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Pskov Oblast 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Oryol Oblast (0.093), 
Republic of Ingushetia (0.262), Ryazan Oblast (0.001), Sakhalin Oblast 
(0.153), Tu la Oblast (0.491). Other potential control units include: Altai 
Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
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Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, 
Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan Oblast, 
Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk 
Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia -
Alania, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Republic of Dagestan 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic (0.633), Krasnod ar Krai (0.055), Republic of Ingushetia (0.312). 
Other potential control units include: Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
North Ossetia-Alania. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.208), Mari El 
Republic (0.338), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.049), Republic of 
Ingushetia (0.343), Republic of North Ossetia-Alania (0.061). Other 
potential control units include: Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan 
Oblast, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Khakassia, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Republic of Karelia 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Arkhangelsk Oblast (0.291), 
Murmansk Oblast (0.709). 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.088), Irkutsk Oblast (0.021), Murmansk Oblast (0.062), Omsk 
Oblast (0.216), Oryol Oblast (0.301), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.125), 
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Sakhalin Oblast (0.188). Other potential control unit s include: Altai 
Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, 
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Republic of Mordovia 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Kirov Oblast (0.494), Mari 
El Republic (0.038), Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.468). 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Murmansk Oblast (0.044), 
Oryol Oblast (0.539), Republic of Adygea (0.145), Republic of 
Ingushetia (0.008), Tomsk Oblast (0.142), Tuva Republic (0.122). Other 
potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, N izhny Novgorod  Oblast, 
Omsk Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of 
Khakassia, Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin 
Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Republic of Tatarstan 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.185), 
Irkutsk Oblast (0.271), Krasnod ar Krai (0.189), Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.03), 
Magadan Oblast (0.085), Republic of Bashkortostan (0.207), Tomsk 
Oblast (0.032). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Kursk Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny 
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Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, 
Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, 
Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Sakha (Yakutia) Republic 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.246), Primorsky Krai (0.754). Other potential control units 
include: Kamchatka Krai, Magadan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Arkhangelsk Oblast (0.339), 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug (0.07), Magad an Oblast (0.002), 
Primorsky Krai (0.365), Zabaykalsky Krai (0.223). Other potential 
control units include: Altai Krai, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, 
Omsk Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk 
Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, 
Voronezh Oblast. 
Stavropol Krai 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Krasnodar Krai (0.845), 
Republic of Adygea (0.026), Republic of Ingushetia (0.13). Other 
potential control units include: Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Kirov Oblast (0.102), 
Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.335), Omsk Oblast (0.016), Oryol Oblast 
(0.222), Primorsky Krai (0.317), Ryazan Oblast (0.008). Other po tential 
control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, 
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Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, 
Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, 
Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania, Sakhalin Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver  Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Tyumen Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.568), Omsk 
Oblast (0.432). Other potential control units include: Tomsk Oblast.  
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.137), 
Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.549), Sakhalin Oblast (0.314). Other potential 
control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, 
Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, 
Krasnod ar Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magad an Oblast, Mari El Republic, 
Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol 
Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, 
Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Volgograd Oblast 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chelyabinsk Oblast (0.33), 
Krasnod ar Krai (0.064), Kursk Oblast (0.076), Omsk Oblast (0.096), 
Primorsky Krai (0.369), Republic of Ingushetia (0.001), Sverd lovsk 
Oblast (0.063). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, 
Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, 
Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess 
Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Magad an Oblast, Mari El 
Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Oryol Oblast, 
Republic of Adygea, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of Khakassia, 
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Republic of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sakhalin Oblast, 
Tomsk Oblast, Tula Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh 
Oblast, Zabaykalsky Krai. 
Vologda Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Arkhangelsk Oblast (0.298), 
Murmansk Oblast (0.702). 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug (0.115), Krasnoyarsk Krai (0.308), Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast 
(0.574), Sakhalin Oblast (0.001), Tula Oblast (0.002). Other potential 
control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, 
Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Kursk 
Oblast, Magadan Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Omsk 
Oblast, Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Ad ygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tomsk 
Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous Okrug 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Altai Krai (0.316), Omsk 
Oblast (0.449), Tomsk Oblast (0.235). 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Belgorod  Oblast (0.281), 
Murmansk Oblast (0.278), Sakhalin Oblast (0.321), Tomsk Oblast (0.12). 
Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk Oblast, 
Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, 
Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay-Cherkess Republic, Kirov 
Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, Kursk Oblast, Magadan 
Oblast, Mari El Republic, Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast, Omsk Oblast, 
Oryol Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Adygea, Republic of 
Bashkortostan, Republic of Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Republic 
of North Ossetia-Alania, Ryazan Oblast, Sverd lovsk Oblast, Tula 
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Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
Yaroslavl Oblast 
Experiment A . Synthetic control is based  on: Ryazan Oblast (0.543), Tula 
Oblast (0.457). Other potential control units include: Ivanovo Oblast, 
Oryol Oblast, Tver Oblast. 
Experiment B. Synthetic control is based  on: Magad an Oblast (0.045), 
Nizhny Novgorod  Oblast (0.2), Republic of Adygea (0.146), Republic of 
North Ossetia-Alania (0.031), Ryazan Oblast (0.355), Sverd lovsk Oblast 
(0.223). Other potential control units include: Altai Krai, Arkhangelsk 
Oblast, Belgorod  Oblast, Chelyabinsk Oblast, Chukotka Autonomous 
Okrug, Irkutsk Oblast, Ivanovo Oblast, Kamchatka Krai, Karachay -
Cherkess Republic, Kirov Oblast, Krasnod ar Krai, Krasnoyarsk Krai, 
Kursk Oblast, Mari El Republic, Murmansk Oblast, Omsk Oblast, Oryol 
Oblast, Primorsky Krai, Republic of Bashkortostan, Republic of 
Ingushetia, Republic of Khakassia, Sakhalin Oblast, Tomsk Oblast, Tu la 
Oblast, Tuva Republic, Tver Oblast, Voronezh Oblast, Zabaykalsky 
Krai. 
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Appendix H. Results of the synthetic controls analysis: treated  units 
and  their synthetic controls 
The regions that have tax concessions for investment (orange group) 
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The regions that have tax concessions for important investment 
(yellow group) 
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Appendix I. Regional factors that might have an impact on 
attractiveness for foreign investment  
Region High share 
of urban 
population 
High share 
of Russian 
population 
High share 
of employed 
with 
secondary 
education 
Developed 
transport 
infrastructure 
Independenc
e from 
transfers 
from the 
federal 
budget 
Low 
share of 
mining 
industry 
Orange regions that attracted more FDI after tax cut 
Amur 
Oblast 
 ‡    ‡ 
Bryansk 
Oblast 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡  ‡ 
Rostov 
Oblast 
 ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Saint 
Petersburg 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Other orange regions 
Chuvash 
Republic 
     ‡ 
Kabard ino-
Balkar 
Republic 
  ‡   ‡ 
Republic of 
Kalmykia 
  ‡   ‡ 
Perm Krai 
‡ ‡   ‡  
Udmurt 
Republic 
‡    ‡  
Yellow regions that attracted more FDI after tax cut 
Kaluga 
Oblast 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Khabarovsk 
Krai 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Komi 
Republic 
‡    ‡  
Kurgan 
Oblast 
 ‡    ‡ 
Leningrad  
Oblast 
 ‡  ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Lipetsk 
Oblast 
 ‡  ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Novosibirsk 
Oblast 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Pskov 
Oblast 
‡ ‡  ‡  ‡ 
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Appendix I. Regional factors that might have an impact on 
attractiveness for foreign investment (cont.) 
Region High share 
of urban 
population 
High share 
of Russian 
population 
High share 
of employed 
with 
secondary 
education 
Developed 
transport 
infrastructure 
Independenc
e from 
transfers 
from the 
federal 
budget 
Low 
share of 
mining 
industry 
Republic of 
Tatarstan 
‡   ‡ ‡  
Yaroslavl 
Oblast 
‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Other yellow regions 
Altai 
Republic 
  ‡   ‡ 
Astrakhan 
Oblast 
   ‡  ‡ 
Kemerovo 
Oblast 
‡ ‡   ‡  
Khanty-
Mansi 
Okrug 
‡    ‡  
Orenburg 
Oblast 
 ‡  ‡ ‡  
Penza 
Oblast 
 ‡ ‡   ‡ 
Republic of 
Dagestan 
  ‡   ‡ 
Republic of 
Karelia 
‡ ‡   ‡  
Republic of 
Mordovia 
  ‡   ‡ 
Yakutia 
Republic 
  ‡    
Stavropol 
Krai 
 ‡ ‡ ‡  ‡ 
Tyumen 
Oblast 
‡ ‡ ‡  ‡  
Volgograd  
Oblast 
‡ ‡   ‡ ‡ 
Vologda 
Oblast 
‡ ‡  ‡ ‡ ‡ 
Yamalo-
Nenets 
Okrug 
‡    ‡  
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Appendix B. The most representative sources for the Worldwide Governance Ind icators (WGI) 
WGI source Government 
effectiveness 
Control of 
corruption 
Regulatory quality Voice and  
accountability 
Rule of law Political stability 
and  absence of 
violence 
Meaning Perceptions of the 
quality of the civil 
service and of its 
independence from 
political pressures, 
the quality of policy 
formulation and 
implementation, 
and  the cred ibility 
of the government's 
commitment to 
such policies 
Perceptions of the 
extent to which 
public power is 
exercised  for 
private gain, 
includ ing both 
petty and  grand  
forms of 
corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the 
state by elites and  
private interests 
Perceptions of the 
ability of the 
government to 
formulate and  
implement sound 
policies and  
regulations that 
permit and  
promote private 
sector development 
Perceptions of the 
extent to which a 
country's citizens 
are able to 
participate in 
selecting their 
government, as 
well as freedom of 
expression, 
freedom of 
association, and  a 
free media 
Perceptions of the 
extent to which 
agents have 
confidence in and 
abide by the rules 
of society, and  in 
particular the 
quality of contract 
enforcement, 
property rights, the 
police, and  the 
courts, as well as 
the likelihood  of 
crime and violence 
Perceptions of the 
likelihood  that the 
government will be 
destabilized  or 
overthrown by 
unconstitutional or 
violent means, 
including 
politically-
motivated violence 
and  terrorism 
Economist 
Intelligence 
Unit 
Quality of 
bureaucracy /  
institutional 
effectiveness 
Excessive 
bureaucracy /  red 
tape 
Corruption among 
public officials 
Unfair competitive 
practices 
Price controls 
Discriminatory 
tariffs 
Excessive 
protections 
Discriminatory 
taxes 
Democracy Index 
Vested  interests 
Accountability of 
public officials 
Human rights 
Freedom of 
association 
Organized  crime 
Fairness of jud icial 
process 
Speediness of 
jud icial process 
Expropriation 
Intellectual 
property rights 
protection 
Orderly transfers 
Armed conflict 
Violent 
demonstrations 
Social unrest 
International 
tensions /  terrorist 
threat 
Reporters 
Without 
Borders 
   Press Freedom 
Index 
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Appendix B. The most representative sources for the Worldwide Governance Ind icators (cont.)  
Freedom 
House 
 Corruption  Political rights 
Civil liberties 
Press Freedom 
Index 
Civil society 
Electoral process 
Judicial framework 
and  independence 
 
World  
Economic 
Forum 
Global 
Competitive
ness Report 
Infrastructure 
Quality of primary 
education 
Public trust in 
politicians 
Diversion of public 
funds 
Bribery: Trade 
Bribery: Utilities 
Bribery: Taxes 
Bribery: Jud iciary 
State capture 
Tax system 
d istortionary 
Trade barriers 
Local competition 
Ease of starting a 
new business 
Anti-monopoly 
policy 
Transparency of 
government 
policymaking 
Freedom of the 
press 
Favouritism in 
decisions of 
government 
officials 
Effectiveness of 
law-making body 
Cost of crime/  
violence 
Reliability of police 
services 
Judicial 
independence 
Efficiency of legal 
framework for 
challenging 
regulations 
IPR protection 
Property rights 
Informal sector 
Cost of terrorism 
International 
Country 
Risk Guide 
Bureaucratic 
quality 
Corruption Investment profile Military in politics 
Democratic 
accountability 
Law and  Order Government 
stability 
Internal conflict 
External conflict 
Ethnic tensions 
US State 
Department 
    Trafficking in 
people 
 
Global 
Insight 
Business 
Conditions 
Ind icators 
Bureaucracy 
Policy consistency 
and  forward  
planning 
Corruption Tax effectiveness 
Legislation 
Institutional 
permanence 
Judicial 
independence 
Crime 
Civil unrest 
Terrorism  
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Appendix B. The most representative sources for the Worldwide Governance Ind icators (cont.)  
Institutional 
Profiles 
Database 
Quality of the 
supply of public 
goods: education 
and  basic health 
Capacity of political 
authorities to 
implement reforms 
Level of petty, 
large-scale and 
political corruption 
Ease of Starting a 
business 
Administered  
prices and  market 
prices 
Competition: 
productive sector: 
ease of market 
entry for new firms 
Competition 
between 
businesses: 
competition 
regulation 
arrangements 
Political rights and  
functioning of 
political institutions 
Freedom of the 
press 
Freedom of 
assembly and 
demonstration 
Respect for 
minorities 
Transparency of 
economic policy 
Award  of public 
procurement 
contracts and 
delegation of public 
service 
Free movement of 
persons, 
information, etc. 
Security of persons 
and  goods 
Organized  criminal 
activity 
Effectiveness of 
fiscal system 
Security of 
property rights 
Security of 
contracts between 
private agents 
Settlement of 
economic d isputes 
Intellectual 
property protection 
Agricultural sector: 
security of rights 
and  property 
transactions 
Conflicts of ethnic, 
religious, regional 
nature 
Violent actions by 
underground 
political 
organizations 
Violent social 
conflicts 
External public 
security 
Afrobaro-
meter 
Government 
handling of public 
services (health, 
education) 
How many 
government 
officials do you 
think are involved 
in corruption? 
How many tax 
officials do you 
think are involved 
in corruption? 
 How much do you 
trust the 
parliament? 
How satisfied  are 
you with the way 
democracy works 
in your country? 
Free and  fair 
elections 
Over the past year, 
how often have you 
feared  crime in 
your own home? 
How much do you 
trust the courts of 
law? 
Trust in police 
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Appendix D. Classification of control and  treatment groups, based  on tax concession for investment  
 
